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Comment
A Bicentennial View of the Role of
Congress, the President, and the Judiciary
in Regard to the Power Over War
I. Introduction
Of the principles which have guided this nation since its in-
ception, none is as firmly established in the law as Justice Mar-
shall's oft-quoted pronouncement that the Constitution is "the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation."1 Yet the consti-
tutional provisions concerning the allocation of the war powers'
were written in "an age of sailing ships and horse-drawn can-
nons ..... ", How applicable are these provisions two hundred
years later - in a world of super-power domination and poten-
tial nuclear war? Some may contend that the very technology of
the nuclear age makes impossible the separation of powers over
war intended by the Framers of the Constitution. Yet the awe-
some reach and potential devastation of modern warfare de-
mand at least as much restraint, surely not less, than that envi-
sioned by those wise draftsmen.
Two hundred years ago, the power to define and initiate war
and to determine its scope and duration lay in different hands
than the power to conduct its progress. When all those powers
come to rest in the hands of one individual, as they do today, it
is time to re-examine the Constitution, its original intent, and its
contemporary application.
Part II of this Comment begins with the language of the
Constitution and then considers the separation of powers over
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
2. To speak of the war power would be a misnomer. See, e.g., Casper, Constitutional
Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI.
L. REV. 463, 486-88 (1975) (listing 27 components or aspects of the power over war).
3. J. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 224 (1986).
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war which the Framers intended to foster through its various
provisions. Several contests of authority early in our nation's
history are examined. These struggles illustrate initial interpre-
tations of the separation and balance of power among the coor-
dinate branches. Part III considers the erosion of congressional
power in subsequent years - coincident with the President's in-
creasing ability to initiate and risk war - and analyzes the ac-
quiescence of the judicial branch.
Congress' attempted reassertion of its constitutional author-
ity over war, through the War Powers Resolution, is the subject
of Part IV. The subsequent failure of the Resolution to restore
the constitutional balance of power is addressed in Part V and is
traced to the lack of judicial support for the congressional effort.
An analysis follows of the likelihood of any future successful ap-
plication of the War Powers Resolution after the Supreme
Court's decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha,4 which may have invalidated one of its major provi-
sions. Part VI concludes that although the Resolution probably
remains unaffected by that decision, the Court will not likely
hear any case arising pursuant to the Resolution. Alternative so-
lutions are then considered and Part VII proposes an amend-
ment to the Constitution to restore Congress' constitutional au-
thority over war and to enable judicial intervention in related
disputes.
This Comment concludes that the separation of powers over
war intended by the Framers no longer exists and that the judi-
ciary will not intervene to restore that intended balance without
a constitutional amendment. It suggests that the bicentennial of
our Constitution is an appropriate time for the nation to con-
sider and debate such a change.
II. The Framers' Intent: A Balance of Power
A. Language of the Constitution
1. Legislative Power Over War
Numerous constitutional grants expressly confer upon Con-
gress fundamental powers over war. Congress is specifically
4. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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granted the power "[t]o declare War"' and a wide range of auxil-
iary powers to effect the declaration, including the exclusive
right to raise funds and control their disbursement. Only Con-
gress is empowered to "raise and support Armies' '1 or to "pro-
vide and maintain a Navy."' The Constitution additionally
grants to Congress the broad power to govern and regulate all
land and naval forces,9 as well as the authority to provide for the
raising and governance of a militia. 10
Congress is also empowered to control a variety of military
actions short of, but related to, war. Specifically, the Legislature
is given authority in regard to "Letters of Marque and Reprisal,
and... Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water."" It can
both define and punish piracy, 2 and determine the extent to
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
6. Id., cl. 1.
7. Id., cl. 12. Perhaps no other provision of the Constitution so clearly evidences the
trust which the Framers of the Constitution were willing to place in Congress, for this
was a power greatly feared. See, e.g., J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1177 (1883) (examining the colonists' fear of a standing army and
of the potential depletion of the national economy). Accord, J. PELTASON, CORWIN &
PELTASON'S UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 76 (1985).
The full scope of Congress' power under this clause is sweeping indeed. See, e.g.,
Selective Service Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (power of conscription); McKin-
ley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 (1919) (Congress may provide for the trial and punish-
ment of all military offenses); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (Congress
may regulate private industry in time of war). Nevertheless, the Framers' trust was not
unlimited and they provided that "no appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a
longer Term than two Years." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. The lack of a temporal limitation on appropriations,
similar to that imposed on Congress in relation to the maintenance of armed forces,
perhaps reflects that the colonists did not similarly fear the navy as a standing threat to
personal liberty.
9. Id., cl. 14. This language appears to be intentionally broad. Note, for example,
that Congress, in reliance on this clause, eventually created a third, independent element
of national military force. See National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 253, 61 Stat.
495 (1947) (creating the national Air Force).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15, 16. Under the National Defense Act of 1916, Con-
gress established the National Guard and the National Guard Reserve, and authorized
the President to establish fitness guidelines and to establish a wartime draft. Pub. L. No.
85, 39 Stat. 166 (1916).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. The intended control, to authorize private individu-
als to engage in actions against an enemy's ships and property, was eventually banned by
the 1856 Pact of Paris. Nevertheless, it is significant that "[t]he purpose of this clause
was to transfer to Congress a power that in Great Britain belonged to the King, or the
executive branch." J. PELTASON, supra note 7, at 75.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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which violations of international law shall be regarded as viola-
tions of national law.13
2. Executive Power Over War
In clear contrast to the numerous express grants of power
conferred upon Congress, the war-related powers enumerated in
the executive article14 are few in number and less clearly de-
fined. Initially, article II of the Constitution provides that "[t]he
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America."' 5 These words have been compared to the
purportedly analogous language of article I which states "[a]ll
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States .... "I" The omission of the words "herein
granted" in article II has generated a debate, still unresolved, as
to whether the Constitution therefore gives the President "a
grant in bulk of all the conceivable executive power . . . [or
merely] the generic powers thereafter stated.""
Equally unclear is the provision that the President be the
"Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia ... "18 which is followed by the addi-
tional words "when called into the actual Service of the United
States."'" These words are evidently included as a limitation. 0
The President is given substantial authority to conduct the
nation's foreign policy, yet even that power is subject to a legis-
lative limitation: the President "shall receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers,"'2 but his authority to make treaties is
"by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate" 2 and is
13. "To define and punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations." Id.
14. U.S. CONST. art. II. Article II was inspired by the New York Constitution of 1777.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (A. Hamilton).
15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
16. Id., art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
17. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (concluding the latter).
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
19. Id.
20. It was Congress - not the President - that was expressly empowered "to raise
... Armies," id, art. I, § 8, cl. 12, to "provide ... a Navy," id, cl. 13, and to "provide for
calling forth the Militia," id., cl. 15. See supra notes 7, 8, 10, and accompanying text.
21. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3, cl. 3.
22. Id., § 2, cl. 2.
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conditioned upon the requirement of a two-thirds concurrence of
the Senators.2
Although these constitutional grants of power to the Presi-
dent - which can be characterized as "war powers" - are few
and vague, that very lack of definition has contributed to the
continual growth of executive power discussed below. Our Con-
stitution has ironically been referred to as one which does not
preclude Congress from "surrendering .. . [its war power] by
allowing the President to assume the initiative on the basis of
his vague but potentially expandable powers."2 Whether or not
that expansion of executive power was either foreseen or in-
tended by the Framers, however, cannot be discerned from the
language of the Constitution itself. Rather, one must read the
Constitution in the context of the era in which it was written. 5
B. The Historical Context
1. Background
When the Framers first met in Philadelphia in May of
1787,8 their view of the world, and of the nature of potential
war in that world, was necessarily and markedly different than it
would be today.27 Britain was a recently antagonized world
power and the United States was a self-liberated nation, in fear
of reprisal from other British colonies and of aggression by the
nations of Europe. 28 The Framers were quite concerned about
23. Id.
24. A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 6 (1976).
25. "The Constitution of the United States, the supreme law of the land, is by no
means self-explanatory." J. PELTASON, supra note 7, at vii.
26. Actually, there had been a prior, but unsuccessful attempt to hold a constitu-
tional convention. Called by a Virginia delegation which included James Madison, it met
in Annapolis, Maryland in 1786. Only five states attended, and the delegates voted to
send delegates to Philadelphia in 1787 instead. To SECURE THESE BLESSINGS: THE GREAT
DEBATES OF THE CONSTrrUTIONAL CoNVENON OF 1787 16 (S. Padover ed. 1970).
27 See, e.g., Javits, War Powers Reconsidered, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 130 (1985). Javits
refers to the Framers as "[tlhose eighteenth-century farmer-politicians" and notes that
they "could have had no grasp of the enormous changes and frightening potential of
uncontrolled armed conflict in the late twentieth century." Id. at 131.
28. See THE FEDERALIST No. 24 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Alexander
Hamilton warned against "an excess of confidence or security. On one side of us, and
stretching far into our rear, are growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain.
On the other side ... are colonies and establishments subject to the dominion of Spain."
Id. at 160-61. See also id. No. 3, at 42-43 (J. Jay) (warning of the danger of hostilities by
19871
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the potential for attack by native Americans,2 9 and were equally
aware of the danger of disunity among the states, should one or
several be attacked s3
In contrast to the concerns of so many contemporary politi-
cal and constitutional scholars, the Framers were far more anx-
ious about the nation's ability to successfully defend itself than
about restraining its ability to wage offensive war. 1 Neverthe-
less, contemporaneous writings make clear the nature and the
separation of powers over offensive war that they intended.
2. The Federalist Papers
That the Framers intended a limited executive role in the
power over war is clearly discernible in the writings made in
support of the adoption of the Constitution by the states. Alex-
ander Hamilton recognized his countrymen's fear of a strong ex-
ecutive when he alleged that the Constitution's opponents
"[c]alculating upon the aversion of the people to monarchy ...
have endeavored to enlist all their jealousies and apprehensions
in opposition to the intended President of the United States; not
merely as the embryo, but as the full-grown progeny of that de-
Portugal, Spain and Britain); No. 41, at 256 (J. Madison) (listing the provision of secur-
ity against foreign danger first in his consideration of the necessary powers of central
government).
29. See id. No. 24, at 161 (A. Hamilton). "The savage tribes on our Western frontier
ought to be regarded as our natural enemies .... " Id.
30. In this regard, the Framers feared not only attack by in-land native Americans,
but maritime attack as well. James Madison, for example, a resident of the coastal state
of Virginia, feared attack by "a foreign enemy, or even... pirates and barbarians .... In
the present condition of America, the States more immediately exposed to these calami-
ties have nothing to hope from the phantom of a general government which now exists
. ... Id. No. 41, at 261 (J. Madison).
31. See, e.g. M. SHAPIRO & R. TRESOLINI, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 165 (6th
ed. 1983) ("The vast powers now exercised by modern Presidents could not have been
envisioned by the framers of the Constitution."); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 164 (1978) (Congress increasingly attempting to limit presidential options); F. WOR-
MUTH & E. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR 268 (1986) ("If the framers were chary
of permitting the President to wield muskets and sail ships, surely we must pause to
consider the wisdom of allowing him to unilaterally control the vast nuclear arsenal.");
Neustadt & Allison, Afterword to R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS at 109 (1971) [hereinafter
Neustadt] (concerning "the respective roles of President and Congress in making war"
(emphasis added)). See generally J. JAVITS, WHO MAKES WAR (1973) (in support of the
War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982), of which he was a co-author).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss3/7
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tested parent. 32
Hamilton analyzed the nature of the executive power and
its limitations.3 He characterized the commander in chief power
as providing "authority [that] would be nominally the same with
that of the king of Great Britian, but in substance much inferior
to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme com-
mand and direction of the military and naval forces .... ",' He
also alluded to the fact that "several of the States expressly de-
clare their governors to be commanders-in-chief,"3 5 thus negat-
ing the image of sweeping power which the words "Commander
in Chief" may seem to hold today. In fact, during New York's
state convention for the ratification of the Constitution, an
amendment was urged to further weaken the President's role as
Commander in Chief by prohibiting him from assuming per-
sonal command of the armed forces "without the previous desire
of the Congress."36 Although the amendment was never adopted
by Congress, the intent and distrust underlying its proposal
seem clear.
In a subsequent writing, Hamilton rhetorically asked "what
would be to be feared from an elective magistrate of four years'
duration with the confined authorities of a President of the
United States? '3 7 It is clear from Hamilton's other writings, as
well, that he considered the President's power to be unquestion-
ably limited."
James Madison's view of the Constitution's allocation of
war powers was tersely, but strongly, stated. He asked whether
the power to declare war was a necessary one, and concluded
that "[n]o man will answer this question in the negative."3 "
Whereas actual declarations of war were generally outmoded
even prior to the writing of the Constitution, 0 it may be as-
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 67, at 407 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
33. See id., Nos. 67-77 (A. Hamilton). (emphasis added).
34. Id. No. 69, at 417-18 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 418.
36. 1 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 330 (J. Elliot ed. 1888).
37. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 435 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis
added).
38. See, e.g., id., No. 77 (referring, inter alia, to "[tihe only remaining powers of the
executive .... " Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
39. Id., No. 41, at 256 (J. Madison).
40. See, e.g., Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Under-
1987]
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sumed that Madison considered Congress to have plenary power
over the initiation of war. In fact he concluded that "[tjhe ex-
isting Confederation, establishes this power in the most ample
form. 14 1 This is particularly significant in that under the Articles
of Confederation Congress had been granted both legislative and
executive powers. The Articles expressly conferred upon Con-
gress "the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on
peace and war ...." That Madison read the power of declara-
tion broadly is clear in his ensuing discussion of Congress' power
of raising and equipping armies and navies. He noted that
"[t]his is involved in the foregoing power [of declaring war]," 4
and argued the necessity of Congress' "indefinite power of rais-
ing troops, as well as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in
peace, as well as in war.""
In all, no less than twenty-three of the eighty-five Federalist
Papers directly addressed questions of power over war and na-
tional defense, all seeking to reassure would-be supporters that
both Congress and the President were sufficiently limited by the
terms of the proposed Constitution. 5
3. Convention Debates
In contrast to the extreme emphasis accorded questions of
war in the Federalist Papers, it is remarkable that prior to the
adoption of the Constitution only one debate at the Constitu-
tional Convention expressly concerned the separation of war
powers. The account of this one debate occupies only two of the
almost 2,000 recorded pages of Convention debates.' One may
standing, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 693 (1972) (tracing undeclared hostilities such as the Seven
Years War between Britain and France, but which occurred principally in the United
States, and the American Revolution itself in relation to French hostilities against
Britain).
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 256 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis
added).
42. ARTS. OF CONFED., art. 9. This language remained unchanged from the very first
draft of the Articles. See M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 258 (1948).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 3, 4, 6, 8,14, 16, 22, 23-29, 30, 31, 34, 41, 46, 53, 56, 69,
70.
46. See generally 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 318-19 (M.
Farrand ed. 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS].
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safely draw two conclusions - that the Framers believed the
Constitution to be clear and unambiguous in this regard, and
that they failed to foresee the ensuing failure of the Constitution
to limit the enormous expansion of executive power in relation
to war.47 The Convention's only debate over the war power well
illustrates this view.
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina initiated the debate by
questioning the wisdom of delegating to Congress, in article I, §
8, cl. 1, the power to make war.4 His concern, however, was
merely whether that power ought to lie instead in the Senate, a
smaller and presumably more efficient body.49 Pierce Butler, also
of South Carolina, suggested that the power be vested in the
President, "who will not make war but when the Nation will
support it;"'50 but the record indicates not even a second for his
proposal. 1
James Madison, joined by Eldridge Gerry of Massachusetts,
subsequently moved to "insert 'declare', striking out 'make' war;
leaving to the Executive [only the] power to repel sudden at-
tacks.' 52 Other records of the time indicate that Madison's pub-
47. See, e.g., Lofgren, supra note 40 ("Americans originally understood Congress to
have at least a coordinate, and probably the dominant, role in initiating all but the most
obviously defensive wars, whether declared or not." Id. at 701).
48. The Committee of Detail had presented to the delegates its initial draft in which
it had granted to Congress, inter alia, the power to make war. RECORDS, supra note 46, at
181-82. The debate took place on August 17, 1887. Id. at 318.
49. "[T]he Legislature's proceedings were too slow. It would meet but once a year.
The House of Representatives would be too numerous .... The Senate would be the
best depository .... " Id. at 318.
50. Id.
51. Id. The view that the public sentiment can or should be a realistic restraint of
presidential war-making authority has been espoused by many modern commentators.
See, e.g., Leigh, The War Powers Resolution: Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and Un-
wise, in CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND FOREIGN POLICY 165, 173 (1984) (arguing that the
best alternative lies in the ordinary political process). See also W. MULLEN, PRESIDENTIAL
POWER AND POLITICS (1976) ("[Slomeone exercises power in part because others empower
him or her to act; leadership implies followers." Id. at 110.). But see Note, Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Authority: The Commerce Clause and the Political Process, 6
PACE L. REV. 599 (1986). ("Given the fact that today Congress appears to respond more
to political action groups and other lobbyists than to its members' constituencies, the
voice of the latter may go unheard." Id. at 636.)
52. RECORDS, supra note 46, at 318 (latter emphasis added). Madison's language
clearly suggests that the word "declare" was intended not to limit Congress to the for-
mality of a declaration, but rather to limit the executive to the necessarily rapid initia-
tion of force required by a "sudden attack" upon the nation.
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lished Convention journals were not entirely accurate as to ini-
tial vote tallies and that there were in fact two votes taken on
this proposed substitution." Connecticut initially voted in the
negative "but, on the remark, by Mr. King,54 that 'make' war
might be understood to 'conduct' it, which was an executive
function, Mr. Ellsworth 5 gave up his objection and the vote was
changed to ay."56
Some delegates would have limited the President even fur-
ther. Butler, despite his initial hesitation, was not only per-
suaded to vote for the above substitution, but went on to pro-
pose that the delegates "give the Legislature power of peace, as
they were to have that of war. ' 57 The motion, however, was de-
feated, apparently on Ellsworth's admonition that peace must be
"attended with intricate & secret negotiations."5 It seems clear
that the delegates did not intend either the foreign affairs power
or the commander in chief power to override Congress' power to
determine the initiation and extent of the nation's involvement
in war.
C. The Intended Struggle for Power
It is certainly true that there has been no unanimity among
constitutional scholars on the intent of the Framers regarding
the separation of war powers in the Constitution. 9 Nevertheless,
53. RECORDS, supra note 46, at xvi (stating that Madison "corrected" his original
notes before writing his journal). See also 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 439 (J. Elliot ed. 1974) [hereinafter DEBATES] (indicating both tallies).
54. Rufus King of Massachusetts.
55. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut.
56. DEBATES, supra note 53, at 439.
57. RECORDS, supra note 46, at 319.
58. Id.
59. For indepth analyses of varying hypotheses, see J. JAVITS, supra note 31 (surpris-
ingly unclear intent, perhaps related to the delegates' limited view of Washington as the
nation's President); W. MULLEN, supra note 51 (a strong and dominant presidential role
was intended); A. SOFAER, supra note 24 (intended, continual conflict between the legisla-
tive and executive branches); F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE, supra note 31 (absolute con-
gressional power over the initiation of war); Berger, War-Making by the President, 121
U. PA. L. REV. 29 (1972) (the role of the President was to be extremely limited); Emerson,
The War Powers Resolution Tested: The President's Independent Defense Power, 51
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 187 (1975) (the Framers intended broad presidential power over
warmaking); Goldsmith, Separation of Powers and the Intent of the Founding Fathers,
in CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND FOREIGN POLICY (1984) ("If there is any aspect of our
Constitution where powers and responsibilities are divided but shared, it is certainly
[Vol. 7:695
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the Framers are acknowledged to have been wise and cautious
draftsmen,60 and one must strongly suspect that they intended
to create the separation of, and struggle for, power, examined in
the section below, which immediately followed the adoption of
the Constitution.
It is clear that the Constitution was written in an era when
war in the context of defense was of primary concern and when
the need for a stronger centralized government was becoming
steadily more apparent. Yet the very framework of that central-
ized government, with its interweaving of checks and balances,
reflected the Framers' strong distrust of government - either in
the hands of the executive or of the legislature -and their reli-
ance on a separation and balance of power between the Presi-
dent and the Congress." One may reasonably conclude that had
the Framers been as concerned about the initiation of war as
they were about the conduct of the nation's defense,62 they
would have desired a similar separation and balance in this
regard.
In fact, James Wilson, a major architect of the Constitution,
did address the question of initiating war. His remarks, made at
here in what is termed the war powers." Id. at 8); Leigh, supra note 51, at 165 (intended
struggle between the branches to be resolved by the political process); Lofgren, supra
note 40 (Congress' power was intended to be greater than that of the President);
Reveley, The Power to Make War, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN
POLICY 90-95 (F. Wilcox & R. Frank eds. 1976) (general balance intended, but generally
tilting toward Congress).
60. The delegates were men of considerable intellectual capacity. See, e.g., CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CHAFF - REJECTED SUGGESTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 158-71 (J. Butzner ed. 1941) (character studies of the other delegates by William
Pierce of Georgia).
61. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 72 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); id.,
No. 48, at 308-13 (J. Madison). The Framers viewed the tendency to seek increased
power as inevitable and, given a system of competing branches, controllable. Hamilton
observed that "[tihe insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the boundaries of
...[the legislative and executive branches] has also been remarked upon; and the ne-
cessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own defense has been inferred
and proved." Id., No. 73, at 442 (A. Hamilton). See also id, No. 77, at 464 (A. Hamilton)
(chronicling the constitutional safeguards against the usurpation of power by the execu-
tive); id, No. 48, at 309 (J. Madison) ("[lit is against the enterprising ambition of ...
[Congress] that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their
precautions.").
62. See supra notes 29-30, 45, and accompanying text. See also id., No. 3 (J. Jay).
"Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct
their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first." Id. at 42.
1987l
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Pennsylvania's ratification convention, indicate the logic of this
conclusion.
This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to
guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a
single body of men, to involve us in such distress, for the impor-
tant power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large;
this declaration must be made with the concurrence of the House
of Representatives. From this circumstance, we may draw a cer-
tain conclusion, that nothing but our national interest can draw
us into a war.3
D. The First Contest
Early contests over the right to initiate war evidenced the
intended separation of power between the President and the
Congress. Interestingly, though, the first such contest, in 1793,
concerned the right of the President to decide not to initiate
war.64 President Washington, in response to a declaration of war
by France against Great Britain, publicly and unilaterally de-
clared a position of neutrality by the United States. 5
James Madison quickly and vehemently opposed Washing-
ton's action." He viewed the President's decision as an invasion
of Congress' power, pursuant to article I of the Constitution, to
declare war;67 therefore, according to Madison, the power to de-
cide when not to declare war was derived from the same
source.
6 8
Alexander Hamilton, on the other hand, defended Washing-
ton's right to exercise such authority as a natural consequence of
63. 2 M. JENSEN, THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 583 (1976) (emphasis added).
64. The Constitution makes no explicit grant of this power.
65. See 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 425-32. (H. Syrett ed. 1969) [here-
inafter PAPERS]. Although France's declaration was made on February 1, Congress ad-
journed on March 2, ignorant of the news. Washington first learned of the situation in
April, during the congressional recess. See also A. SOFAER, supra note 24, at 103-04
(chronicling the event).
66. A. SOFAER, supra note 24, at 111.
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
68. Madison considered this to be a matter of simple logic. See A. SOFAER, supra
note 24, at 113-16. See also, A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, JR., THE WAR MAKING POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT 10 (1982) [hereinafter THOMAS].
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his foreign affairs power under article II of the Constitution.""
The Legislative Department is not the organ of intercourse
between the United States and foreign Nations. It is charged
neither with making nor interpreting Treaties.
If the Legislature have a right to make war on the one hand -
it is on the other the duty of the Executive to preserve peace till
war is declared .... 70
Hamilton was not alone in his view of the proper separation
of power in this seemingly unanticipated context. John Jay,
writing to Hamilton about Washington's proclamation, praised
America's fortune in having a "Presid[ent] who will do nothing
rashly . ,,. In like manner, John Quincy Adams lauded
Washington for his firm stance against America's involvement in
war. 
2
Despite equally strong support for and against the Presi-
dent's right to decide not to initiate war, the issue did not reach
the judiciary. When Washington eventually reported to Con-
gress, albeit in large measure an ex post facto exercise, he was
exceedingly deferential to Congress' right either to uphold, alter,
or reverse his proclamation.73 Congress, in turn, praised the
President and formally approved his declaration of neutrality.74
E. Judicial Enforcement of the Framers' Intent
1. Undeclared War
Five years after Washington's proclamation of neutrality,
President Adams embarked on the nation's first undeclared war
since its adoption of the Constitution. The so-called "Naval
War" was fought against France in response to France's increas-
69. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 3.
70. PAPERS, supra note 65, at 37, 40.
71. Id. at 308.
72. 1 THE WRIINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 147 (W. Ford ed. 1968). It is possible
that Adams' support of Hamilton's position may have been motivated less by constitu-
tional interpretation than by personal bias. Adams was strongly involved in Washing-
ton's selection as Commander in Chief of the Continental Army. This role may have led
to his position as the nation's first President. J. JAVITS, supra note 31, at 25.
73. See A. SOFAER, supra note 24, at 115, 116.
74. Id. at 116.
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ing interference with American shipping.76 Congress authorized
all necessary financial and military support requested by the
President.7 One commentator describes Congress' approval of
an undeclared war as a "conscious national policy."' 77 This re-
flects the political realities of America's earlier ties to France
and its discomfort with a formal declaration of hostility against
a recent ally. 8
President Adams' authority to initiate and conduct a war
which had not been formally declared by Congress was brought
before the Supreme Court in Bas v. Tingy,79 the judiciary's first
decision on the separation of powers over war. The case was
brought by the owner of an American merchant ship which had
been captured by a French privateer and then recaptured by an
American warship. The owner was forced to pay salvage costs
under various acts of Congress, all of which concerned an ex-
isting state of war. The plaintiff alleged that the forced payment
was unconstitutional in that a "state of war" could not exist be-
cause Congress had never formally declared war.
Writing in seriatim, the Justices regarded the hostilities
against France, and the President's actions in directing those
hostilities, as taking place pursuant to an implicit declaration of
war by Congress. They variously described the war as an "im-
perfect war"80 , a "public war,"" a "partial war, ' and a war
"qualified . . . in the manner prescribed by the constitutional
organ of our country. '83 Justice Chase emphasized that for polit-
ical reasons - for example, America's then natural predisposi-
75. France had been a principal ally of the United States throughout America's
struggle for independence from Britain, but America - weary of battle - chose to re-
main neutral in the ensuing war between France and Britain. France, angered by
America's neutrality, issued decrees which made American shipping increasingly difficult.
Within one year, France had seized more than 300 American ships, mostly for technical
violations of previously unenforced treaty provisions, and America responded by arming
its vessels and greatly increasing its fleet. For a discussion of the three year period of
hostility, see A. SOFAER, supra note 24, at 139-61.
76. Id. at 144-61.
77. Id. at 139.
78. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 45 (1800) (Chase, J.).
79. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
80. Id. at 40 (Washington, J.).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 45 (Chase, J.).
83. Id. at 46 (Patterson, J.).
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tion toward the French - Congress might consciously wish to
avoid a formal declaration. "Congress is empowered to declare a
general war, or Congress may wage a limited war; limited in
place, in objects, and in time." 8" Thus, the Court effectively up-
held the President's right to initiate an undeclared war by grant-
ing Congress the right of implicit declaration through its support
of the President's actions.8
5
The Court's emphasis on Congress' role in regard to war
seemed to shift in Talbot v. Seeman,86 a case similar to Bas v.
Tingy, which arose in the same context. The opinion, written by
Chief Justice Marshall, states:
The whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United
States, vested in congress, the acts of that body alone can be re-
sorted to as our guides in this enquiry. It is not denied, nor in the
course of the argument has it been denied, that congress may au-
thorize general hostilities, in which case the general laws of war
apply to our situation; or partial hostilities, in which case the laws
of war, so far as they actually apply to our situation, must be
noticed. 7
Yet, despite this apparently sweeping language, in neither Tal-
bot v. Seeman nor in Bas v. Tingy, did the Court squarely ad-
dress the type of separation of powers issue which it might have
addressed had it been forced to resolve the issue surrounding
Washington's proclamation of neutrality in 1793.88 It remained
for a subsequent decision for the Court to reach the more funda-
mental questions concerning the separation of powers over war.
2. A Narrow Reading of Presidential Authority
A direct legislative-executive conflict arose over an act of
Congress which authorized the President, inter alia, to instruct
captains of American vessels to seize any ship sailing toward a
French port.89 President Adams subsequently issued orders to
84. Id. at 43 (Chase, J.) (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 42 (Washington, J.). "What then is the effect of legislative will? In fact
and in law we are at war .... "
86. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1809).
87. Id. at 28.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
89. The pertinent language of the act provided that "if any ship or vessel ... shall
be voluntarily carried or suffered to proceed to any French port or place... every such
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American captains and directed them as follows:
You are not only to do all in you that lies, to prevent all inter-
course, whether direct or circuitous, between the ports of the
United States, and those of France or her dependencies, where
the vessels are apparently as well as really American, and pro-
tected by American papers only, but you are to be vigilant that
vessels or cargoes really American, but covered by Danish or
other foreign papers, and bound to or from French ports, do not
escape you."
The owner of a vessel sailing from a French port was seized
pursuant to the President's orders. He contended that Adams
had overstepped his authority because Congress had explicitly
authorized only the seizure of vessels sailing toward French
ports. In the case Little v. Barreme,91 Chief Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, agreed with the shipowner. Marshall, con-
sidering Adams' right to issue such orders, implied that normally
Adams would probably have such authority pursuant to his
power as Commander in Chief of the Navy:
It is by no means clear that the president of the United
States... who is commander in chief of the armies and navies of
the United States, might not, without any special authority for
that purpose, in the then existing state of things, have empowered
the officers commanding the armed vessels of the United States,
to seize and send into port for adjudication, American vessels
which were forfeited by being engaged in this illicit commerce.92
Yet Marshall went on to observe that "the legislature seemed to
have prescribed that the manner in which this law shall be car-
ried into execution, was to exclude a seizure of any vessel not
bound to a French port."93
The Court held that the President's actions were made sub-
sequent to a narrow grant of authority by Congress and were,
therefore, limited by that express grant. 4 That the Court did so
ship or vessel, together with her cargo, shall be forfeited . . . and shall be liable to be
seized .... Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 2, § 1, 1 Stat. 613, 615 (1799).
90. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178 (1804).
91. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
92. Id. at 177.
93. Id. at 177-78.
94. Id. at 178.
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without further explanation implies a fundamental assumption
that Congress' power over war is greater than that of the Presi-
dent, even in matters that arguably fall within the domain of his
power as Commander in Chief."
It seems clear that in the years following the adoption of the
Constitution, the judiciary did not hesitate to address the ques-
tions raised by the separation of war powers created by the
Framers. The Court upheld the President's authority under his
foreign affairs and commander in chief powers,' but subordi-
nated that authority to Congress' exercise of its power - not
only as to its right to declare and delineate the bounds of hostili-
ties,97 but even as to its authority to control the conduct of the
hostilities.96 Yet, by upholding the President's right to fight an
undeclared war, albeit with the conscious consent of the Con-
gress,9 the Court paved the way for the expansion of executive
power discussed below.
III. The Shift Toward Greater Executive Power
Despite the deference initially accorded Congress in its right
to exercise its war powers during the nation's early years,100
Presidents became increasingly bold in the next century and a
half. Nearly as many major wars were undertaken without any
congressional declaration as with one.101 Indeed, despite a his-
tory of almost continuous use of military force abroad,10 ' only
95. This assumption is supported by the Court's assertion that Congress' narrow
grant of authority was ill-advised and compared poorly to Adams' wiser, albeit insup-
portable, directive:
It was so obvious, that if only vessels sailing to a French port could be seized on
the high seas, that the law would be very often evaded, that this act of congress
appears to have received a different construction from the executive of the United
States; a construction much better calculated to give it effect.
Id. at 178.
96. Bas v. Tingy, supra note 79; Talbot v. Seeman, supra note 86.
97. See supra text accompanying note 87.
98. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., supra note 73 and accompanying text.
101. The major undeclared wars were the First Barbary War (the war with Tripoli)
of 1801-1805, the Second Barbary War of 1815, the American-Mexican War of 1914-1917,
and the Korean War of 1950-1953. For an account of each of these wars, see generally J.
JAVITS, supra note 31.
102. See infra notes 104-106, 108.
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five wars have been declared since the adoption of the
Constitution.103
It is in these allegedly minor, but increasingly numerous,
uses of force against other nations that the shift of war power
toward the executive branch is most clearly evident. By 1850,
Presidents had unilaterally initiated the use of force against
other nations no less than twenty-seven times.1" By 1950, there
had been more than one hundred additional executive initia-
tives, as Presidents sent forces all over the world with increasing
frequency. 05
A. Claims of Executive Authority
The many uses of military force initiated by the executive
have been categorized and distinguished in innumerable ways,
both by commentators and by the Presidents who authorized
them. 06  Senator Jacob Javits referred to this scenario
103. These were the War of 1812 against Britain, the Mexican War of 1846-1848, the
Spanish-American War of 1898, and the First and Second World Wars. THOMAS, supra
note 68, at 10-12.
104. Actually, there were 36 distinct uses of military force but several of these in-
volved what was in essence a continuation of an earlier action. See HOUSE COMM. ON
FOREIGN AFF., BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES
IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, H. R. Doe. No. 16, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1970) [hereinafter
BACKGROUND INFORMATION].
105. Africa, Antigua, Argentina, Bahamas, Bermuda, Brazil, British Guiana, Chile,
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Formosa, Ger-
many, Greenland, Guatemala, Haiti, Hawaii, Honduras, Iceland, Jamaica, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Newfoundland, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Phil-
lipines, Samoa, Siberia, Soviet Russia, St. Lucia, Syria, Trinidad, Turkey, and Uruguay
have all experienced the engagement of American forces solely by presidential initiative.
Id. at 51-57.
106. One author lists nine classifications into which presidentially initiated actions
can be categorized:
1. Covert intelligence operations and clandestine paramilitary operations
2. Diplomatic actions that imply subsequent military operations, e.g., severing dip-
lomatic relations
3. Deployment of armed forces in nonhostile situations, e.g., rotation of troops to
meet alliance commitments
4. Mobilization of military forces, e.g., call up of army reserves
5. Deployment of armed forces in hostile situations, e.g., commitment of armed
forces to combat zones
6. Limited military engagements, e.g., protection of U.S. citizens, property, and
public ships, seizures, and reprisals
7. Limited military interventions, e.g., civil commotions, claims settlements, bor-
der disputes, and preemption of third-party interventions
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss3/7
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disparagingly:
We have had "police actions"; we have had "surgical strikes"; we
have had "invitations to assist". We have had, in other words, a
bad case of euphemism-itis. For war is war; and the loss of life,
the expenditure of treasure and the agony of the people . . . is
occasioned by acts of war and not by anything else. °7
Yet as Presidents have employed a varied vocabulary to de-
scribe their initiation of military force, so have they alleged vari-
ous claims of constitutional justification. Frequent claims of
right have been the real or alleged protection of American citi-
zens overseas, 10 8 or that apparently offensive military actions
are actually responses to perceived threat and are made in the
national self-defense.109 Constitutionally, the claims of executive
authority fall within the encompassing view that the President's
commander in chief, foreign relations, and executive powers
combine to create inherent constitutional authority to act as he
sees fit in the defense of the nation or of its interests." 0
Perhaps the most pervasive claim of executive authority is
made pursuant to the President's treatymaking power,"' as dis-
cussed below. In this context, it is easy to see why the rapid
growth of international commerce and relations would hasten
the shift of power over war from the legislative to the executive
branch.
8. Material wars, i.e., undeclared wars: the Naval War with France, the Barbary
Wars, the Civil War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War
9. Publicly declared wars: the War of 1812, the Mexican War of 1846-48, the
Spanish-American War of 1898, World War One, and World War Two.
E. KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR 91 (1982).
107. Javits, supra note 27, at 132-33.
108. In 1854, for example, a small force was sent to Greytown, Nicaragua to protect
an American company's property and personnel from feared civil disturbances. An ini-
tially minor incident led to the town's complete destruction. American forces were again
deployed in Nicaragua, on similar grounds, in 1909, 1912, and 1927. Many other coun-
tries experienced the presence of American troops based on claims of protectionism. See
C. PYLE & R. Pious, THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 302-304, 311
(1984) [hereinafter C. PYLE]. See also THOMAS, supra note 68, at 16-17.
109. Actually, this justification was asserted as early as 1801, when President Jeffer-
son sent warships to Tripoli to protect American merchants against an anticipated at-
tack. See THOMAS, supra note 68, at 31-32.
110. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jack-
son, J. concurring).
111. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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B. Congressional Acquiescence
As the power to initiate the use of military force increas-
ingly shifted toward the President, Congress, in turn, became in-
creasingly acquiescent.
1. Declaration of War
Although Congress apparently retained the narrow author-
ity to issue a formal declaration of war, even that power, if it can
be called such, was rarely used. As noted above, Congress has
declared war only five times throughout a history of military in-
tervention. " 2 Remarkably, in only one of those five instances
did Congress actually initiate the war."' It did so in 1812 over
the objections of President Madison. " 4 Since that time, Con-
gress has never once initiated the use of force. Even its other
four "declarations of war" were in reality declarations made in
response to a state of war which had already existed. " 5
2. Congress' Failure to Assert its Prerogatives
Constitutionally, Congress was hardly limited in its ability
to restrain the President from his use of military force. In addi-
tion to the explicitly granted war powers,"' Congress can, of
course, vote to terminate war." 7 It can generally frustrate the
President - by denying military and civilian appointments, for
example'is - and can effectively obstruct the President through
various types of limiting legislation." 9 Nevertheless, Congress'
112. See supra notes 101-106, 108.
113. Congress declared war against Great Britain, stating "[tihat war be, and the
same is hereby declared to exist." Act of June 18, 1812, ch. 102, 2 Stat. 755 (1812).
114. THOMAS, supra note 68, at 10.
115. The declaration of war against Mexico, for example, noted that "whereas, by
act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists .. " Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, 9
Stat. 9 (1846). Similarly, the declaration of war against Spain began, as did the earlier
declaration against Britain, "war be, and the same is hereby declared to exist," but
added "and that war has existed since the twenty-first day of April .... " Act of April
25, 1898, ch. 189, 30 Stat. 364 (1898). Similar language and circumstances underlie the
two World War declarations. Act of April 6, 1917, ch. 1, 40 Stat. 1 (1917); Act of Dec. 11,
1941, chs. 564-65, 55 Stat. 796, 797 (1941).
116. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
118. Id. § 2, cl. 2.
119. For example, Congress can cut funding for defense spending and can focus po-
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response to the increasing frequency of Presidential initiative,
when not actually supportive, was at least one of passive
acceptance. 2 '
It can be argued, of course, that Congress' subsequent sup-
port, or at least its passive acquiescence, is tantamount to an
implicit declaration of war by Congress. This would, in fact, ap-
pear to follow the reasoning of the Court in Bas v. Tingy.12'
However, Congress' acquiescence may have been more a result of
political reality than of its conscious constitutional will.
Many commentators feel that the strongest reason for the
shift of power toward the executive branch, and Congress' acqui-
escence in that shift, is simply the continuous growth and in-
creasing complexity of international relations - a field in
which the President clearly predominates 2 2 - and the concur-
rent growth in the complexity of domestic affairs to which Con-
gress alone must respond. Tuchman, for example, writes that "as
the country has moved into a dominant world position and the
domestic areas of federal function have multiplied and grown
more complex, the presidency has steadily extended its reach,
while the Congress has abdicated in proportion .... 23
The fact of the matter is that presidential initiatives have
generally been popular at the time, even if later discredited, 24
and Congress has always been a political body. The Framers felt
litical pressure on the executive through the use of investigative and oversight commit-
tees. See, e.g., BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 104, at 30-31 (detailing Congress'
constitutional and political prerogatives).
120. Only once during the entire period of expansion of presidential power did Con-
gress formally react to an executive initiative, but it was well after the fact. Although
Congress declared war against Mexico in 1846, it later learned that it had done so in
response to a covert and deceitful instigation of hostilities by the President. Congress
subsequently voted to officially censure President Polk. For an account of the incident,
see THOMAS, supra note 68, at 11.
Conceivably, Congress could even have used its power of impeachment in response
to such a situation. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; art. II, § 4. Most commentators, however,
feel that impeachment is a drastic action - far too dangerous a step to be undertaken
without the most extreme provocation. See, e.g., Israel, Preface to H. GARZA, WATERGATE
INVESTIGATION INDEX (1985).
121. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). See supra text accompanying notes 79-85.
122. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; § 3, cl. 3.
123. Tuchman, Foreword to J. JAVITS, supra note 31, at vi-vii.
124. See, e.g., supra note 120.
1987]
21
PACE LAW REVIEW
confident that giving the power of the purse to Congress would
provide ample control over the President. Yet as one commenta-
tor has observed, "[hiistory provides little support for the effec-
tiveness of the check that Jefferson applauded .... Once into
war, Congress has generally supported the President.""1 '
It has also been suggested that the shift of power may have
been a function of the large size of Congress and of the increas-
ing ease with which Presidents were able to act unilaterally in a
changing world."2 6 Some commentators have suggested that Con-
gress grew uncomfortable with a power which, although separate
under the Constitution, came to be viewed as an extension of
foreign policy. 127
Most likely, the assumption of power by the executive
branch, with the passive concurrence of the Legislature, was the
result of many factors - some simple and others complex - as
the world increasingly changed in ways which the Framers could
not have foreseen.128 It did not take place, however, without the
conscious concurrence of the judiciary.
C. Judicial Retreat
Throughout the century and a half of growth of executive
power, the judiciary retreated from its initial scrutiny of execu-
tive abuse and protection of Congress' authority. Its retreat par-
alleled Congress' passivity throughout.
125. C. PYLE, supra note 108, at 287.
126. See Neustadt, supra note 31, suggesting that the President has become "more
dependent on Executive officials for advice as well as execution than our Constitution
makers could have anticipated ....
"New checks and balances replace the old." Id. at 118. In analyzing why Presidents
"have shied away from Congress in making decisions about war," secrecy and flexibility
are considered to be paramount factors. Id. at 140.
127. E.g., Sofaer, The Presidency, War, and Foreign Affairs: Practice Under the
Framers, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 12, 38 (1976). Sofaer states that "(tihe notion that
Congress should become more involved in making and implementing foreign policy is
unassailable in theory. But Congress has consciously chosen other roles for itself .
Id.
128. See supra notes 27-28, 31. One may argue that if the Framers failed to foresee
the nature of a new and different role, then the desire to retain the separation of power
they envisioned may be inappropriate. The events of the Vietnam era, however, dis-
cussed in the text below, indicate the continuing wisdom of their original intent.
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1. A Forerunner of the Political Question Doctrine
Only two decades after its restrictive reading of executive
authority in the 1804 case, Little v. Barreme, 9 the Court had
already abandoned its earlier willingness to actively resolve is-
sues relating to the separation of powers over war. In Martin v.
Mott,' ° the Court considered the judgment of a court martial
which resulted from the complainant's failure to obey an execu-
tive order calling forth the militia in New York State. Although
the case did not concern the use of military force abroad, it is
strikingly analogous to the Court's Vietnam-era decisions dis-
cussed below.
Initially, the Court noted that "[t]he Constitution declares
that Congress shall have power 'to provide for calling forth the
militia .. . ."1' Pursuant to an act of Congress,3 2 the Presi-
dent was empowered to call forth the militia in "cases of actual
invasion, or of imminent danger of invasion."' ' The question
raised here was whether the President acted within the scope of
that congressional delegation; that is, whether there was in fact
an imminent danger of invasion.13 4
The Court recognized that the power to call forth the mili-
tary was not one taken lightly by the Framers:
The power thus confided by Congress to the President, is, doubt-
less, of a very high and delicate nature. A free people are natu-
rally jealous of the exercise of military power; and the power to
call the militia into actual service is certainly felt to be one of no
ordinary magnitude. But it is not a power which can be executed
without a correspondent responsibility. It is, in its terms, a lim-
ited power, confined to cases of actual invasion, or of imminent
danger of invasion." '
The Court asserted that the true issue, then, was "by whom is
the inquiry to be judged of [sic] and decided? Is the President
129. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
130. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
131. Id. at 28-29 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15).
132. Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424 (1795). This act repealed an earlier law,
Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (1792), but the differences in the prior law con-
cerned only provisions relating to the commission and pay of troops and officers. Id., § 4.
133. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 29.
134. Id. at 29-30.
135. Id. at 29.
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the sole and exclusive judge whether the exigency has
arisen . . .?"" The Court concluded that he was precisely that.
The Court's rationale was primarily that "[w]henever a stat-
ute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by
him upon his own opinion of certain facts... the statute consti-
tutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those
facts."1 7 This reasoning would eventually become a substantial
part of the now frequently employed political question
doctrine.13 8
Actually, the act in question in Mott, which purportedly
granted such broad discretion to the President, is susceptible to
other interpretations.13 9 The act provided:
[W]henever the United States shall be invaded, or be in immi-
nent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe, it
shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth
such number of the militia of the state, or states .. .as he may
judge necessary . . .and to issue orders . . .as he shall think
proper." "
The discretionary power, then, may be seen to relate primarily
to his commander in chief power.
It is true that the act clearly intends, by its absence of any
contrary provision, that the President shall also initiate the or-
der to call forth the militia. This is especially clear in light of the
subsequent clause which, in contrast, empowers the President to
call forth the militia to suppress an intrastate insurrection only
136. Id. at 29-30.
137. Id. at 31-32.
138. The doctrine, in its broadest sense, came to mean that certain cases are not
properly resolved by the judiciary because there exists:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning ad-
herence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncement by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 71-79 (1978) (discussing the doctrine in its constitutional context).
139. The Supreme Court overturned the decisions of the courts below, neither of
which read the President's authority as broadly.
140. Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 1, 1 Stat. 424 (1795) (emphasis added).
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"on application of the legislature of such state, or of the [state's]
executive, [when the legislature cannot be convened] ....
Although the President's judgment, regarding the number of
troops raised and the orders given to them, may be beyond the
Court's authority, it does not necessarily follow that his judg-
ment in determining that an emergency existed is beyond the
review of the Court. No language in the statute indicates that
this should be so.
Perhaps recognizing the weakness of its rationale, the Court
suggested:
The power to provide for repelling invasions includes the power
to provide against the attempt and danger of invasion, as the nec-
essary and proper means to effectuate the object. One of the best
means to repel invasion is to provide the requisite force for action
before the invader himself has reached the soil. 4"
It may well be that early preparation is wise, but upholding the
activation of the militia on such grounds is a rather broad inter-
pretation of Congress' actual grant of power to call forth the mi-
litia "whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in im-
minent danger of invasion ....
In Little v. Barreme1" the Court had stated what it be-
lieved would be a wiser and more cautious grant of power by
Congress to the President, 45 but had nevertheless conceded
Congress' authority to act as it saw fit and had upheld its narrow
grant of authority. 46 In Mott, the Court retreated from its ear-
lier role in preventing executive abuse of power and instead ex-
pressed a trust - with which the Framers surely would have
disagreed - that "the danger [of misconduct] must be remote
• ..[because of] the high qualities which the Executive must be
presumed to possess, of public virtue, and honest devotion to the
public interest . ". .., Additionally, the Court asserted that
141. Id. at § 2.
142. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 29.
143. Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 1, 1 Stat. 424 (1795) (emphasis added).
144. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
145. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
146. The Court interpreted a congressional act authorizing the seizure of ships sail-
ing to France, as effectively denying executive authority to seize ships returning from
France. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
147. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 32.
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"the frequency of elections, and the watchfulness of the repre-
sentatives of the nation, carry with them all the checks which
can be useful to guard against usurpation or wanton tyranny."48
2. A Narrow Reading of Congressional Authority
The Court's deference to presidential authority and its re-
treat from support of Congress' constitutional role continued in
subsequent years. In The Prize Cases,"1 9 the Court responded to
claims made by ship owners damaged by President Lincoln's
blockade of southern ports in 1861. As owners of vessels, whose
cargoes were seized in the course of conflict, they claimed resti-
tution.15 0 The government contended that the President's proc-
lamation of a blockade constituted the initiation of war and,
therefore, the normal guarantees of commerce were sus-
pended. 51 The owners conceded that the President had legally
exercised his emergency powers pursuant to an authorizing act
of Congress,1 52 but contended that only Congress could formally
declare and initiate a state of war - which it had not done prior
to the blockade and which it failed to do when it reconvened
after the initiation of hostilities. 55
The Court looked not so much to the Constitution as to
what it saw as the logic of the situation:
However long may have been its previous conception, it neverthe-
less sprung forth suddenly from the parent brain, a Minerva in
the full panoply of war. The President was bound to meet it in
the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to bap-
tize it with a name; and no name given to it by him or them could
change the fact.1 5 4
Yet the Court clearly recognized the absence of Congress' in-
tended role:
148. Id.
149. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). The so-called Prize Cases were actually a compi-
lation of four separate cases - The Brig Army Warwick, The Schooner Crenshaw, The
Barque Hiawatha, and the Schooner Brilliante - but all were related by several com-
mon issues, among them the technical existence of a state of war.
150. Id. at 637-38.
151. Id. at 650-55.
152. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
153. The Prize Cases, supra note 149, at 639-50.
154. Id. at 669.
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If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the Presi-
dent is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He
does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge
without waiting for any special legislative authority. And whether
the hostile party be a foreign invader, or States organized in re-
bellion, it is none the less a war, although the declaration of it be
"unilateral."'58
Surprisingly, the Court cited the Mexican War of 1846-1848 as
precedent, in that the President had acted unilaterally but had
been "vindicated" by Congress when it subsequently undertook
a formal declaration of war. 15 The Court failed to note that
Congress shortly thereafter had censured the President for his
actions when it learned of the allegedly deceitful manner in
which he had precipitated the entire event. 157 Furthermore, in
the instant case, Lincoln's blockade was not followed by any for-
mal congressional declaration.
The Court's holding was by no means unanimous. Four Jus-
tices joined in a strong dissent and urged the Court's return to
the Framers' intended separation of war powers:
This great and pervading change in the existing condition of
a country, and in the relations of all her citizens or subjects, ex-
ternal and internal, from a state of peace, is the immediate effect
and result of a state of war: and hence the same code which has
annexed to the existence of a war all these disturbing conse-
quences has declared that the right of making war belongs exclu-
sively to the supreme or sovereign power of the State.
This power in all civilized nations is regulated by the funda-
mental laws or municipal constitution of the country.
By our Constitution this power is lodged in Congress. Con-
gress shall have power of the Country "to declare war, grant let-
ters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures
on land and water."' "
The dissenting Justices recognized the President's authority
to meet threats of imminent danger either from abroad or within
pursuant to his executive and commander in chief powers. "
155. Id. at 668.
156. Id.
157. See supra note 120.
158. The Prize Cases, supra note 149, at 688 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 690-91.
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"The whole military and naval power is put under the control of
the President to meet the emergency." 160 In contrast, however,
the legal and technical initiation of war rests only with "Con-
gress, who can, if it be deemed necessary, bring into operation
the war power, and thus change the nature and character of the
contest."16 "Congress alone can determine whether war exists or
should be declared ..... " Nevertheless, the majority appar-
ently remained unpersuaded in this viewpoint and the Court
thereby further retreated from its earlier recognition 6 3 of the
fundamental separation of war powers pursuant to articles I and
II of the Constitution.
A decade later, in The Protector,'64 the composition of the
Court had changed,'66 and the majority view was strengthened.
The Court was faced with the issue of determining the running
of statutes of limitation which were to be delineated in relation
to formal declarations of the initiation and termination of
war."'66 Having already decided that Lincoln's announcement of
the blockade constituted the beginning of war, the Court held
that the executive proclamations initiating and later terminating
the blockade were equivalent to formal declarations of the initia-
tion and termination of war.'17 Contrary to its lengthy opinion in
The Prize Cases, this holding was brief and was issued without
dissent. 18 It must have been increasingly clear to any legislators
concerned with the loss of Congress' constitutional authority
over war that if relief were to be found, it would not be through
the judiciary.
Following the Civil War, the nation healed its wounds and
again turned its attention outward. As American forces inter-
160. Id. at 692.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 693.
163. See Little v. Barreme, supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
164. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700 (1871).
165. See infra note 168.
166. 79 U.S. at 700-01.
167. Id. at 702.
168. The Protector holding constitutes only two pages in the official reporter, com-
pared to 27 pages in The Prize Cases, not including the dispositions of the four individ-
ual cases. The constitution of the Court itself had changed in the intervening years with
the death of four Justices. IV THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-
1969, THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS, at 3220-24 (L. Friedman & F. Israel, eds. 1969).
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vened in dozens of countries by the start of World War I, and
throughout the world by the start of World War II, '9 the judici-
ary's silence and Congress' passivity enabled the continued ex-
pansion of the executive power over war.
IV. An Attempt to Restore the Separation and Balance of
Power
By the victorious conclusion of World War II, the nation's
acceptance of an extremely powerful President stood in stark
contrast to the Framers' mistrust of an overly strong executive
branch.17 0 Yet it was the rapidly changing state of the world
thereafter which led to the revitalization of a long-dormant de-
bate between Congress and the President over the right to initi-
ate war.
A. Background
1. Widespread International Involvement
Following World War II, the United States was left with a
large, permanent military establishment with foreign bases
throughout much of the world. 71 It became a world power with
a might surely unimagined even by John Jay who had propheti-
cally written that "the time may come, if we are wise, when the
fleets of America may engage attention."' 72
As international tensions flared around the globe, the
United States engaged in a widespread network of alliances
through collective self-defense treaty commitments. The Senate,
approving every treaty proposed, gave broad authority to the
President to maintain and defend our relations with a total of
forty-three nations. 7  The treaties generally contained language
169. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
170. Jacob Javits wrote that "[t]he Second World War consolidated the popular at-
titude toward presidential leadership." J. JAvrrs, supra note 31, at 237. Corwin noted
"the immense reinforcement that recognized 'emergency' is capable of bringing to presi-
dential leadership. ... E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT. OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at
312 (R. Bland, T. Hindson & J. Peltason rev. ed. 1940) (5th ed. 1984).
171. THOMAS, supra note 68, at 118-19.
172. THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 48 (J. Jay) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
173. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., WAR POWERS, S. REP. No. 606, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 31 (1972) (examining the treaties and the conditions under which they were en-
tered into and enacted).
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calling upon each signator nation to act "in accordance with its
constitutional process,"1 7 ' but that language was never legally
challenged as to its implication of the necessity for further Con-
gressional assent.17 5
Initially, as presidential power increased, only a few Mem-
bers of Congress began to challenge executive authority or even
to raise the constitutional issues. Senator Guy Gillette of Iowa,
for example, voted against the NATO Alliance only because he
feared a corresponding increase in presidential authority." 6 Sen-
ator Robert Taft of New York, who favored strong international
alliances, nevertheless foresaw and warned against the resulting
growth of executive power over the use of military force.177 Such
Congressmen were, however, part of a then small and unsuccess-
ful minority.
By 1951, the United States had become engaged in a major
undeclared military action in Korea, absent any official congres-
sional declaration or authorization. President Truman based his
authority on a United Nations initiative - which, not coinci-
dentally, was itself initiated by the United States. 7 8 He invoked
his constitutional executive and commander in chief powers and,
in support of his actions, issued a memorandum illustrating an
unbroken history of executive military initiative. 7 9
Within the next decade, as criticism mounted in Con-
gress, 8 0 a majority nevertheless supported further executive mil-
itary initiatives through congressional resolutions. The Formosa
Resolution of 1955 not only gave the President full authority to
employ armed forces for the protection of Formosa, but left the
termination of the resolution itself to the judgment of the Presi-
dent. 81 Although the Middle East Resolution of 1957 originally
required the President to report to Congress biannually8 2 - in
174. Id. (quoting from Art. I, § 1 of the SEATO Treaty).
175. The question was certainly raised from time to time, but "[tihere was no au-
thoritative answer." Id.
176. J. JAvrrs, supra note 31, at 246.
177. Id.
178. 24 DEP'T. OF ST. BULL. No. 604, at 168-69, 198 (1951).
179. 23 DE'T. OF ST. BULL. No. 576, at 173-79 (1950).
180. See J. JAVITS, supra note 31, at 241-52 (chronicling the debates over passage of
NATO and its aftermath).
181. Act of Jan. 29, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-4, 69 Stat. 7 (1955).
182. Act of Mar. 9, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-7, 71 Stat. 5 (1957).
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apparent deference to the small but growing number of con-
cerned Members of Congress - it was subsequently amended to
grant him full and absolute discretion in that regard.1 8
2. Cuban Missile Crisis: A Turning Point
In 1962, Congress became alarmed at reports of planned Cu-
ban intervention throughout the southern hemisphere and,
shortly thereafter, at secret intelligence reports indicating the
buildup of Soviet missiles in Cuba." 4 Congress issued a resolu-
tion which indicated its determination to prevent Cuba, by any
necessary means, from engaging in acts of subversion or aggres-
sion, but did not authorize any unilateral action by the Presi-
dent. 8 5 Yet, one month later, President Kennedy ordered a total
blockade of Cuba, directly challenged the Soviet Union, and
thereby precipitated the nation's first threat of global nuclear
war - under "the authority entrusted to me by the Constitu-'
tion, as endorsed by the Resolution of the Congress . "... 186
Despite the success of Kennedy's immensely risky action' 8 7 it
may well be that the seeds of discontent over presidential war-
making and war-risking, expressed so strongly in the Vietnam
era which followed, were rooted in this crisis.
3. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and Its Repeal: Congres-
sional Revolt
Two years later, in 1964, in response to a continuing and
expanding war in Southeast Asia, Congress passed the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution, granting the President full military author-
ity and discretion to respond to Communist aggression in the
area.' Under this broad grant of authority, President Johnson
began the commitment of more than five hundred thousand
183. 22 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
184. For a detailed account of the Cuban missile crisis, see R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN
DAYS (1971). The book also provides an insight into President Kennedy's attitudes to-
ward what he regarded to be the appropriate role of Congress (very limited).
185. S.J. Res. 230, 76 Stat. 697 (1962).
186. Address to the nation by President Kennedy (Oct. 22, 1962), reprinted in R.
KENNEDY, supra note 184, at 153, 156 (emphasis added).
187. The Soviet Union did finally back down on the very brink of a full military
super-power confrontation. See R. KENNEDY, supra note 184, at 87-88.
188. H.J. Res. 1145, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
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Americans to an undeclared war in Vietnam and the long over-
due debate on the power to initiate war was begun in earnest."8 9
As the Southeast Asian conflict expanded, so did the debate
over the President's authority to commit the nation to war. Nu-
merous bills were introduced to cut off funding for Southeast
Asian operations, but, in fear of undermining our already com-
mitted troops, they were always defeated.1 90
The war continued, the debate continued, and in 1970 Con-
gress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.191 Nevertheless,
the war in Vietnam was not terminated until 1973, and bombing
in neighboring Cambodia continued. An increasingly frustrated
Congress began to debate what was to become the landmark
War Powers Resolution.9 2
B. War Powers Resolution
The War Powers Resolution was Congress' response to a
war which it never declared, but which proved to be the longest
and most costly war in our nation's history.193 It was the first
attempt by Congress to formally and unequivocally reassert the
189. For an account of the build-up and growing unrest under the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, see, J. JAVITS, supra note 31, at 253-61.
190. See THOMAS, supra note 68, at 120. "Congress continued to appropriate money
... implicitly acknowledging that once American troops were committed in war, Con-
gress had little choice but to support them. The power to cut off appropriations seemed
too drastic to be used as an effective tool to circumscribe presidential power." Id.
191. Actually, the repeal was passed as a rider to the Foreign Military Sales Act of
Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053, 2055 (1971), perhaps reflecting
Congress' continuing inability to squarely address the issue. President Nixon stated that
he had no objection to the rider, because he had "the constitutional right - not only the
right but the responsibility - to use his powers to protect American forces when they
are engaged in military actions." N.Y. Times, July 2, 1970, at A10, col. 2. The President
signed the Sales Act, but affirmed his earlier opinion of the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution by asserting that he had not relied upon the Resolution in claiming authority
to conduct the war. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1971, at Al, col. 8.
192. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982). President Nixon vetoed the Resolution, but
Congress overrode his veto. H.J. Res. 542, § 7, 87 Stat. 555, 560 (1973). For an account of
the genesis of the War Powers Resolution, see Franck, After the Fall: The New Proce-
dural Framework for Congressional Control over the War Power, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 605,
611-14 (1977).
193. Although never declared, the war involved the commitment of a half million
American troops to a foreign nation, bombing raids which exceeded the scope of all the
aerial bombing of World War II, and the loss of 50,000 American lives. See J. JAVITS,
supra note 31, at 259.
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separation and balance of the war powers created by the drafters
of the Constitution nearly two centuries earlier:
It is the purpose of this [joint resolution] to fulfill the intent
of the Framers of the Constitution of the United States and in-
sure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the
President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involve-
ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and
to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such
situations. '"
The Resolution undertook to expressly delineate and con-
fine the President's commander in chief power:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-
in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities,
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursu-
ant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authoriza-
tion, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the
United States, its territories or possessions or its armed forces."'
The War Powers Resolution established various safeguards
to enforce its sense of the proper separation of power between
Congress and the President.
1. The Consultation Requirement
Congress expressly asserted its right to participate fully in
all decisions involving military initiatives. The consultation pro-
vision of the Resolution requires that "[t]he President in every
possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indi-
cated." 196 Even after such consultation has taken place, the
President must "consult regularly with the Congress until . . .
Forces are no longer engaged ... or have been removed ....
Congress thereby asserted its right not only to participate in ini-
194. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (1982).
195. Id. § 1541(c).
196. Id. § 1542 (emphasis added).
197. Id.
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tial decisionmaking, but to be continually involved in any ongo-
ing military situation.
2. The Reporting Requirement
The Resolution contains a provision which establishes a
forty-eight hour reporting requirement. The requirement is trig-
gered by any substantial or significant employment of military
force absent a congressional declaration of war.198 The President
is then ordered to report the nature of the employment, includ-
ing his estimate of the "scope and duration of the hostilities or
involvement.' ' 19 9 Furthermore, he must assert the constitutional
and legislative justification for his actions.2 00
The "reporting" provision specifies three circumstances in
which the President will be required to fulfill its conditions: the
introduction of force
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while
equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely
to supply, replacement, repair or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed
Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation
201
Additionally, the provisions require that the President must
provide any other information requested by Congress "in the
fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to
committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States
Armed Forces abroad. '20 2
3. The "Sixty-day Clock"
The importance of the reporting requirement is that it trig-
gers a strict temporal limitation. Within sixty days after the
submission of the report or the requirement that it be submit-
198. Id. § 1543.
199. Id. § 1543 (a)(A),(C).
200. Id. § 1543 (B).
201. Id. § 1543 (a).
202. Id. § 1543 (b).
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ted, whichever comes first, "the President shall terminate any
use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such
report was [or should have been] submitted .... ,,203
Only three circumstances would permit the President to
continue an on-going military action: if Congress were to declare
war or otherwise expressly authorize executive action; if Con-
gress were to extend the sixty-day period; or if Congress were
unable to act due to an actual attack upon the United States. °4
Additionally, the President may briefly extend the "sixty-day
clock" to permit the safe and orderly withdrawal of American
troops2 05
4. The Right to Order Removal of Forces
The strongest provision of the War Powers Resolution pro-
vides that, notwithstanding the sixty-day requirement, Congress
may at any time order the President to remove armed forces.206
As discussed below, the wording of this provision now casts
doubt on its continued validity - in fact, on the continued va-
lidity of the entire Resolution.
It is clear that Congress intended a strong reaffirmation of
its constitutional right to initiate and terminate war and to par-
ticipate meaningfully in the conduct of war. That it has not suc-
ceeded is not so much an indictment of its drafting ability as it
is the result of the Court's unwillingness to enforce Congress'
intent to restore a balance of power.
V. Continued Frustration of the Framers' Intent
Despite Congress' avowed desire "to fulfill the intent of the
framers of the Constitution ...and insure . ..the collective
judgment of both the Congress and the President, 20 7 its enact-
203. Id. § 1544(b).
204. Id.
205. The President is granted the right to extend the period to not more than 90
days if he certifies that "unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United
States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of
bringing about a prompt removal of such forces." Id. Congress was intent upon avoid-
ing another Vietnam-type situation in which the presence of American forces leads to the
alleged necessity of continuing military support in a typical "catch 22" scenario.
206. Id. § 1541(c).
207. Id. § 1541(a).
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ment of the War Powers Resolution did little or nothing to stem
the shift of power over war from Congress to the President.
Jacob Javits, an author of the Resolution, never relented in his
support of the intent of the Resolution, but did freely admit to
its failure.20 In the first ten years following its enactment, for-
eign military involvement continued in the Caribbean, Latin
America and the Middle East.209 Presidents reported to Con-
gress on six occasions - but not once did they consult with
Congress prior to the initiation of military action.210
One may infer that Congress substantially retreated from its
assertion of constitutional authority, but should not conclude
that it did so with unanimity. Several congressional leaders,
frustrated with their fellow legislators' failure to challenge the
President, asserted their grievances through the judicial branch.
They did so without success, as the judiciary repeatedly asserted
the doctrine of nonjusticiability' 1 and effectively relinquished
the role which the courts had embraced in the nation's earlier
years.
208. See Javits, supra note 27.
The fact is that the last three Presidents - Messrs. Ford, Carter and Reagan
-have consulted with the Congress on occasion, sometimes reluctantly and even
grudgingly; the consultations have varied greatly in quality . . . . Also, the record
shows that presidents took military measures without the effective prior consulta-
tion with Congress that is required under the resolution.
Id. at 134.
209. President Ford's actions in the Mayaguez incident of 1975 led to the loss of 40
marines' lives, in an ill-fated and unnecessary rescue attempt. President Carter at-
tempted, but failed, to secure the release of American hostages held in Iran. President
Reagan sent marines to Beirut in the midst of military hostilities and political chaos. See
id. at 134-35.
210. For an account of these incidents, see Note, The Future of the War Powers
Resolution, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1407, 1420-21 (1984).
211. The doctrine of justiciability is highly complex and far too broad for separate
consideration within this Comment which, in the text below, considers only specific in-
stances of its use. In its simplest sense, the doctrine refers to the process whereby "fed-
eral courts decide whether they would be acting appropriately if they resolved the ques-
tion which the litigants press upon them." L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at 53. For a thorough
exposition on the nature and exercise of the doctrine, see id. at 52-114.
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A. El Salvador
1. Background
In 1981 and 1982, public concern mounted over what many
feared was a Vietnam-type buildup of "military advisors" in El
Salvador.2 12 When a reporter asked the President why advisors
were photographed carrying M-16 assault weapons, he answered
"[tihe only thing I can assume is that they were for personal
"1213protection ....
As our involvement progressed, the only formal action taken
by Congress was an attempt to condition financial aid to El Sal-
vador on semi-annual certifications by the State Department
that the El Salvadoran government was progressing in its recog-
nition of human rights. 14 As many had feared, the number of
"advisors" did in fact increase substantially as American in-
volvement continued in subsequent years and American soldiers
were directly attacked.215 Despite these events, which clearly
met the criteria of the War Powers Resolution, the President did
not comply with it and Congress did not invoke it.216 Dissenters
in Congress united to seek relief through the judicial branch.
2. Crockett v. Reagan
In Crockett v. Reagan,21 7 twenty-nine Members of Congress
sought a declaratory judgment that President Reagan had sup-
plied military equipment and aid to El Salvador in violation of
the War Powers Resolution."' The District Court of the District
212. American forces were first employed in November of 1979 according to govern-
ment allegations. See Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d
1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
213. Exchange with Reporters on the Situation in El Salvador and Budget Issues, 1
PUB. PAPERS 174 (Feb. 12, 1982).
214. International Security and Development Cooperation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-113,
95 Stat. 1519, 1555-57 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.) (1981).
The law expired on October 1, 1983 and an extension was killed by the President's
pocket veto.
215. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1984, at A3, col. 1; id., Mar. 30, 1984, at Al, col. 1; id,
Mar. 31, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
216. An effort to prohibit the further use of troops without the approval of Congress
was defeated. Id., Apr. 3, 1984, at A6, col. 1.
217. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), afl'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
218. The suit also alleged violations of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2304
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of Columbia dismissed the action. Its dismissal was affirmed on
appeal and the Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari.21 '
a. Impracticality of Factfinding
The court noted that apart from potential disagreement be-
tween the parties over the meaning of the words "imminent in-
volvement in hostilities" as used by the War Powers Resolu-
tion,220 there was a real and serious discrepancy as to the facts
regarding the alleged employment of armed forces in El
Salvador.221
The plaintiff Members of Congress asserted that American
military personnel were aiding El Salvador's ruling junta2 2 2 in its
war against an insurgent movement. 223 They further alleged that
American personnel were present in areas of heavy combat, and
cited a report by the General Accounting Office that American
forces had been fired upon.224 The defendant Reagan adminis-
tration, however, denied that American forces were militarily in-
volved in either exercises or in planning activity. The govern-
ment contended that the forces "have the sole function of
training Salvadoran military personnel so as to create a self-
training capability in particular skills ... 225
The court concluded that "the factfinding that would be
necessary to determine whether U.S. forces have been intro-
duced into hostilities or imminent hostilities in El Salvador ren-
ders this case in its current posture non-justiciable. ' '22  The
court conjectured that
[e]ven if the plaintiffs could introduce admissible evidence con-
cerning the state of hostilities in various geographical areas in El
Salvador where U.S. forces are stationed and the exact nature of
(1982). 558 F. Supp. 902. This claim, which was dismissed by the court in its equitable
discretion, is not considered here as it is outside the scope of this Comment.
219. 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
220. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
221. Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 897-98.
222. "Junta" refers to the Salvadoran Revolutionary Government Junta. Id. at 895.
223. "Insurgent movement" refers to the Democratic Revolutionary Front and the
Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). Id.
224. Id. at 897.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 898.
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U.S. participation in the conflict. . . the Court no doubt would
be presented with conflicting evidence on those issues by
defendants. 127
The court had noted earlier in its opinion that the govern-
ment had submitted a declaration by the Director of the De-
fense Security Assistance Agency, General Graves, "not exactly
claiming that American military personnel have never been ex-
posed to hostile fire .. " 2 It is at least arguable that the gov-
ernment would not, or more likely could not, have denied that
American forces were being fired upon. Despite the court's
lengthy discussion of the parties' contrary contentions concern-
ing the reason for the presence of American forces in El Salva-
dor, 9 the War Powers Resolution is operational merely upon
the introduction of forces into "hostilities or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
. 0 Yet the court declined to reach this question.231
b. Judicial Interpretation of the Reporting Requirement
In addition to their allegation that the President had ille-
gally introduced forces into El Salvador, the plaintiffs sought a
declaration from the court that the President had violated the
reporting provision of the War Powers Resolution. 32 They fur-
ther alleged that "whether or not he makes the report, the 60-
day period begins to run from the time the report should have
been submitted"3 and that a court "may order the President to
make the report or to withdraw the forces. '2 3'
The actual wording of the provision at issue is "[w]ithin
sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to
227. Id.
228. Id. at 897.
229. Id. at 896-900.
230. See supra notes 194-195 and accompanying text.
231. The court did, however, consider whether the introduction of forces into El
Salvador had been exercised pursuant to "specific statutory authorization," as alleged by
the government. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. The court did not regard
earlier congressional legislation, as constituting specific authorization within the meaning
of the War Powers Resolution. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. See Crockett,
558 F. Supp. at 896.
232. Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 901.
233. Id. at 900 (emphasis added).
234. Id.
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be submitted . . . . ,,2" The court considered whether this lan-
guage intended mandatory withdrawal after a report had merely
been implicitly required by the nature of the ongoing situation,
or rather expressly required by vote of Congress or by a court
mandate.236
The court looked to what it considered to be the relevant
purposes of the Resolution - to inform and involve the Con-
gress - and to the drafting committees' debates. It concluded
that "when a report has not been filed, it is consistent with the
purposes and structure of the WPR to require further congres-
sional action before the automatic termination provision
operates. '2 37
Principally, the court noted that "the majority of Congress
might not be of the opinion that a specific authorization is nec-
essary for continued involvement . -. Yet, the express lan-
guage of the Resolution, to which the court does not refer, limits
the Executive to the exercise of his commander in chief author-
ity in two situations: congressional authorization - through a
declaration of war or by specific statutory authorization - or in
a national emergency precipitated by an attack upon the United
States. 39 It does not allow the President to act upon the silent,
but presumed, consent of Congress.
Neither did the court look to the language either immedi-
ately preceding the sixty-day clock provision - which specifies
the nature of the "requirement" at issue - or immediately fol-
lowing the provision - which specifies three express
exceptions. 2 14
Although the court quoted the sixty-day clock reporting
provision as reading "as is required to be submitted... ,, the
omitted language, which reads "pursuant to [50 U.S.C.] section
1543(a)(1)" ' 11 is never addressed by the court. The relevant sec-
tion mandates that the President "shall" submit [a report]
235. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982).
236. Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 901.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1982).
240. See infra note 245.
241. Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 900.
242. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982).
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within 48 hours . . .""I and the triggering event is indeed one
defined by the situation - the introduction of forces into ongo-
ing or imminent hostilities - not by congressional action. " The
court also failed to address the relevance of the three exceptions
which immediately follow the termination requirement:
[T]he President shall terminate any use of United States Armed
Forces . . .unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has en-
acted a specific authorization for such use of United States
Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or
(3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack
upon the United States.2 45
The enumerated exceptions do not include the implied consent
of Congress through inaction; in fact, the third exception would
strongly weigh against any such presumption of intent.
The plaintiffs had contended that the War Powers Resolu-
tion was meant to be "[flully self-executing, designed as it is to
prevent involvement in military actions without positive action
by Congress. 2 46 The court's holding in Crockett v. Reagan es-
sentially strengthens the Executive by leaving to his discretion
the necessity of reporting to Congress and thereby triggering the
withdrawal requirement.247 Had Congress in fact voted to re-
quire the President to report, its right to invoke the Resolution,
given the disputed facts of the case, would presumably still have
led to a nonjusticiable question.
B. Nicaragua
1. Background
America's involvement in El Salvador was paralleled by its
initial support and subsequent rejection of a Nicaraguan
(Sandanista) government. The Sandanistas received America's
support in their overthrow of the ruling Samoza dictatorship,
but lost favor when they openly aided the insurgents in El Sal-
243. Id. § 1543(a) (emphasis added).
244. Id.
245. Id. § 1544(b).
246. Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 900.
247. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982).
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vador.245 Once again the United States government denied any
direct military involvement and Congress failed to invoke the
War Powers Resolution.2" As in the case of El Salvador, Mem-
bers of Congress sought redress through the judicial branch, and
again were denied relief.
2. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan
In Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, °50 twelve Members of Con-
gress 251 sued to "stop an alleged undeclared war waged by the
federal defendants against the people and government of Nica-
ragua, 's52 claiming "violations of their authority to declare war
under.., the Constitution... and the War Powers Resolution
.... 2 The district court dismissed the action by invoking the
doctrine of "political questions. 25 4 The doctrine holds that an
issue is improper for judicial review if 1) its resolution is consti-
tutionally committed to a coordinate branch; or 2) a court lacks
manageable standards for resolving the issue; or 3) its resolution
would constitute a lack of respect for, or cause embarrassment
to, a coordinate branch.2 55
248. See generally Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua 1984, I.C.J. 392 (Nicar. v. U.S.) [hereinafter Nicar.] (a case before the
World Court in which the United States declined to participate and in which its actions
were condemned as violating international law); Cole, Challenging Covert War: The
Politics of the Political Question Doctrine, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 155 (1985) [hereinafter
Cole] (chronicling United States involvement in Central America); Note, Applying the
Critical Jurisprudence of International Law to the Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 71 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1194-95 (1985)
(discussing the American presence in Nicaragua).
249. One should not assume, however, that Congress approved of the President's
actions. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
250. 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), afl'd, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
251. Actually, the 12 congressional plaintiffs joined two Florida residents and 12
non-resident Nicaraguan aliens to create a broader base for their arguments. Sanchez-
Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 598. The court, however, treated each group of plaintiffs inde-
pendently in regard to each of the claims asserted. The issues raised by the non-congres-
sional plaintiffs are not dealt with here as they are beyond the scope of this Comment.
252. Id. at 598.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 599.
255. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (describing the components of the
political question doctrine which are summarized here). See also Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 518-19 (1969) (quoting the Baker criteria). See generally J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 2 § IV, E (2d ed. 1983) (discussing the
doctrine of political questions).
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a. Respect for Coordinate Branches
The court found that it lacked "judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving the dispute presented,"'2 56 as
it had in Crockett v. Reagan.57 Principally, however, the court
expressed concern that any decision would show a lack of re-
spect for a coordinate branch or would create "embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question. '"58 The court noted:
President Reagan has stated on numerous occasions, to the Con-
gress and to the public at large, that he is not violating the spirit
or the letter of ... statutes, in Nicaragua. By all media accounts,
members of both Houses of Congress strenuously disagree with
the President's assertion. Were this Court to decide . . . one or
both of the coordinate branches would be justifiably offended.259
Thus the court left the resolution of the issue to Congress
and the President. Yet Congress had already tried, albeit unsuc-
cessfully, to restrict the President's actions.6 0 In fact, the court's
alternative basis for dismissal, as discussed below, implied that
256. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 600.
257. 558 F. Supp. at 898. See supra text accompanying note 226.
258. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 600.
259. Id.
260. Congress had taken numerous steps to attempt to restrict the President's ac-
tions in Nicaragua. Initially, it passed the Boland Amendment, which forbade either fi-
nancial or military assistance to Nicaraguan insurgents. Continuing Appropriations Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1830, 1865. Nevertheless, the Amendment
was unsuccessful in stopping the covert war, as noted in a report by the House Intelli-
gence Committee. H.R. REP. No. 122, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1983). Subsequently,
the House of Representatives passed two bills prohibiting all support for any nature of
military or paramilitary Nicaraguan operations, but they were not then supported in the
Senate. 129 CONG. Rc. H5881 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1983); 129 CONG. REc. H8426 (daily ed.
Jul. 28, 1983). As Nicaraguan actions continued and intensified, however, both the House
and Senate voted to condemn the President's mining of Nicaraguan harbors. 130 CONG.
REc. S4205 (daily ed. April 10, 1984); 130 CONG. REC. H2920-21 (daily ed. April 12, 1984).
Shortly thereafter, the Senate supported a House vote to deny the President's request
for increased funding for covert Nicaraguan activities. 42 CONG. Q. 1554 (June 25, 1984).
It is true that some of these actions were taken after the district court's considera-
tion of Sanchez-Espinoza. Nevertheless, they were all taken prior to the appellate review
and, as such, were all relevant and cognizable on appeal. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Callo-
way, 499 F.2d 982, 989 (5th Cir. 1974) (appellate consideration of committee hearings
and reports subsequent to the consideration of the case in chief); Rothenberg v. Security
Mgmt. Co., 667 F.2d 958, 961 n.8 (11th Cir. 1982) (duty of appellate court to consider
subsequent relevant developments).
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Congress did not attempt to restrict executive encroachment on
its constitutional power to initiate war.
b. Doctrine of Equitable Discretion
The doctrine of equitable or remedial discretion enables a
court to avoid a separation of powers issue which it believes
might be alternatively resolved within a coordinate branch:
The most satisfactory means of translating our separation-of-
powers concerns into principled decision-making is through a doc-
trine of circumscribed equitable discretion. Where a congressional
plaintiff could obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators
through the enactment, repeal, or amendment of a statute, this
court should exercise its equitable discretion to dismiss the legis-
lator's claim.2 '
The court asserted that here the congressional plaintiffs'
"primary avenue of relief" '262 is through the legislative process. It
expressed its concern that by reaching a judicial resolution, it
might thwart "Congress's will by allowing ... plaintiff[s] to cir-
cumvent the process of democratic decisionmaking." ' s The
court failed to take notice of the fact that the War Powers Reso-
lution itself was drafted to redress an inequitable separation of
powers26' and that the congressional plaintiffs were seeking judi-
cial enforcement of the legislative process.
The court's apparent restraint was not a neutral stance.
[W]here a President's actions fundamentally challenge the struc-
ture of government, millions of dollars are spent, large numbers
of lives lost, and neither functional nor constitutional bases for
political question dismissal exists, the prudential concerns for
"respect" and "embarrassment" can hold little sway. Most impor-
tantly, judicial restraint does not merely avoid the issue; it neces-
sarily sanctions the President's actions, by leaving the unconstitu-
tional status quo unaltered.265
261. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 601 n.5 (quoting Riegle v. Federal Open
Mkt. Comm., 656 F. 2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
262. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 601 n.5.
263. Id. (quoting Riegle, 656 F.2d at 881).
264. See supra text accompanying note 194.
265. Cole, supra note 248, at 171-72. The author worked at the Center for Constitu-
tional Rights, counsel for the plaintiffs in Sanchez-Espinoza.
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Further, and bolder, executive initiatives proved the truth of
this assertion.
C. Grenada
1. Background
On October 25, 1983, nearly two thousand U. S. Marines
and Army Rangers invaded the island nation of Grenada. In five
days, the island was militarily secured." 6 The President notified
Congress of the invasion, but did so only after it was underway:
"In accordance with my desire that the Congress be informed on
this matter, and consistent with the War Powers Resolution, I
am providing this report on this deployment of the United
States Armed Forces."" 7 Yet no mention was made of prior con-
sultation, as required by the War Powers Resolution,6 8 nor did
the President concede to Congress' authority to activate the
Resolution's "sixty-day clock."2 9 To the contrary, President
Reagan's letter to Congress expressly stated that "it is not possi-
ble to predict the duration of the temporary presence" and con-
tained the ambiguous assertion that "forces will remain only so
long as their presence is required. '27 0
Both the Senate and the House individually attempted to
invoke the time limitation, but Congress was unable to enact
any invoking legislation.27' Quite possibly, Congress' inability to
force the withdrawal of troops reflected the fact that is was
faced with a fait accompli. Once again, individual Members of
Congress sought judicial intervention.
266. For a detailed account of the invasion and an analysis of the relevant issues of
international law, see Joyner, Reflections on Lawfulness of Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L.
131 (1984).
267. H.R.J. Res. 402, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1983).
268. See supra notes 196-197 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text.
270. H.R.J. Res. 402 supra note 267, at 39.
271. See 129 CONG. REc. H8,884 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1983) (debate on a time limita-
tion amendment to H.R.J. Res. 402, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), adopted by the House,
but subsequently rejected by the Senate); 129 CONG. REC. S14,868-903 (daily ed. Oct. 28,
1983) (adopting a similar amendment to a debt ceiling bill which was subsequently
defeated).
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2. Conyers v. Reagan
In Conyers v. Reagan,"2 eleven congressional plaintiffs
sought both declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that
the President had violated Congress' constitutional authority to
initiate war and sought a judicial mandate directing the with-
drawal of all military forces from Grenada.2 73 Again, the judici-
ary effectively affirmed the President's unilateral exercise of the
war power by dismissing the congressional plaintiffs' action.27 4
Unlike the previous actions into which the court refused to
intercede, here there could be no claim of judicial impracticality
of factfinding nor could the court claim reluctance to impede an
ongoing, sensitive operation. The invasion - a clear and public
violation of the War Powers Resolution and Congress' constitu-
tional authority - was completed long before the court issued
its ruling. 275 The court relied almost entirely on what it asserted
to be alternative legislative remedies.
a. Availability of Alternative Remedies
As it did in Sanchez-Espinoza, the court asserted the doc-
trine of circumscribed equitable discretion,76 leaving Congress
to exhaust its own remedies before seeking judicial intervention.
In Conyers, the court specified what it believed to be the availa-
ble legislative remedies: "The War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1541 et seq., appropriations legislations, independent legisla-
tion or even impeachment."' 2"7 The court concluded that "[i]f
plaintiffs are successful in persuading their colleagues about the
wrongfulness of the President's actions, they will be provided
the remedy they presently seek from this Court. 2 7 8
The court did not address the fact that the President's inva-
sion of Grenada, without prior congressional consultation, had
already violated the War Powers Resolution.2 7 9 Nor did the
272. 578 F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal dismissed, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
273. Conyers, 578 F. Supp. at 326.
274. Id. at 327.
275. See supra note 266.
276. Conyers, 578 F. Supp. at 326.
277. Id. at 327.
278. Id.
279. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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court take notice of the futility of congressional actions in inhib-
iting executive initiatives.8 0 As to the court's suggestion that
Congress might even resort to impeachment, many commenta-
tors have suggested that impeachment is a process frought with
danger and would potentially threaten not only the balance of
power between coordinate branches, but the very fabric of the
Constitution itself.2 81 It has also been observed that a congres-
sional impeachment proceeding against a President for violation
of Congress' war power would "represent adjudication by an in-
terested party of his own cause."282 Thus, the court left Congress
to exhaust solutions that were arguably unnecessary, ineffectual,
or inappropriate.
b. Embarrassment of a Coordinate Branch
The court did note that two of the congressional plaintiffs
had failed in an attempt to initiate legislation condemning the
President's actions in Grenada.283 While it is possible that Con-
gress' failure to vote a formal condemnation reflected political
reality rather than a consideration of constitutional issues, the
court argued that by deciding the legality of the executive initia-
tive, it "would unnecessarily and unwisely interfere with the leg-
islative process and raise significant separation of powers con-
cerns. '2" Yet this judicial reluctance to decide a separation of
powers issue is not always so evident, as indicated below.
VI. Viability of the War Powers Resolution
Although the judiciary has been reluctant to decide the sep-
aration of powers issue inherent in the constitutional division of
280. See, e.g., supra note 260 and accompanying text.
281. See, e.g., R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 300 (1973);
P. HOFFER & N. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 264-65 (1984); J.
LABOwITz, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 257 (1978).
282. Berger, Presidential War Powers in THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENCY: ANNUAL
CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 41, 54 (1975).
283. Actually, the initiative was rejected by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
and was not reported to the full House for a vote. Conyers, 578 F. Supp. at 327. There-
fore, although Congress never voted for the proposed condemnation, it would be inaccu-
rate to assert that Congress supported the President's initiative.
284. Id.
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war powers, it did act decisively in regard to the validity of legis-
lative vetoes of executive agency actions.26 5 The Supreme
Court's invalidation of the legislative veto in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha2l 8 has put into issue the con-
tinued validity of the War Powers Resolution which itself con-
tains a legislative veto provision.287 However, one must carefully
consider the focus of Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha before concluding that its holding would in fact invali-
date either the entire Resolution or even its legislative veto
provision.
A. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha
At issue in Chadha was the constitutional validity of a sec-
tion of the Immigration and Naturalization Act2"" that author-
ized either House of Congress to overturn the orders of the At-
torney General suspending the deportation of particular aliens.
The Court held that the legislative veto violated both the bicam-
eralism 89 and presentment290 requirements of the Constitution.
Because the War Powers Resolution requires a concurrent
resolution of both Houses of Congress 91 to terminate hostilities,
bicameralism is not at issue. Nevertheless, the Court's belief
that the presentment requirement alone would invalidate a leg-
285. The legislative veto has most typically been employed when Congress has cho-
sen to "delegate broad powers of domestic initiative to the President or to various agen-
cies, subject to a veto power exercisable by Congress as a whole, by one House, or by a
committee." L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at 161. See also, J. BOLTON, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO:
UNSEPARATING THE POWERS (1977).
286. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
287. "[Alt any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities
outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a decla-
ration of war of specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the
President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution." 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c)
(1982).
288. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503, 1254(c)(2) (1982).
289. Bicameralism refers to "the division of a legislative body into two chambers, as
in the United States government (Senate and House)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 147
(5th ed. 1979). U.S. CONST. art. I § 1. To become a law, a bill must "have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate . Id. § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added). See
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 948-51.
290. Presentment refers to the requirement that legislation be submitted to the
President for approval before it becomes law. U.S. CONST. art. I § 7, cls. 2, 3. See infra
text accompanying note 294. See also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-48.
291. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1982).
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islative veto provision was made clear in a decision which imme-
diately followed Chadha. In a memorandum decision, the Court
affirmed a lower court holding which had applied the Chadha
rationale to a two-House veto.29 2
1. The Presentment Requirement of the Constitution
The Chadha Court asserted that the presentment require-
ment of the Constitution reflected the universal desire of the
Framers and was of particular importance to them in assuring a
system of checks and balances.2 3 The Constitution provides:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives
and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
President of the United States ....
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to Which the Concurrence of
the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary ...
shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or
being disaproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the
Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and
Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.2 4
2. The Separation of Powers Issue
The Chadha Court held that these provisions "are integral
parts of the constitutional design for the separation of pow-
ers." 295 Presentment gives the President "a constitutional and
effectual power of self-defence. '296 It protects the nation against
"whatever propensity Congress might have to enact oppressive,
292. United States House of Representatives v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983). The
Court upheld the lower court's invalidation of § 21(a) of the Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. § 57a-l(a) (1982), which provided that an FTC
trade regulation shall become effective unless disapproved by both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. The fact that both Houses retain the veto power, thereby
avoiding any violation of the Constitution's requirement for bicameralism, supra note
289, did not deter the court of appeals from holding that the legislative veto nevertheless
violated "the principles of separation of powers established in ... the Constitution."
Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
293. 462 U.S. at 946-47.
294. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3.
295. 462 U.S. at 946.
296. Id. at 947 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 73 at 458 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed.
1888)).
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improvident, or ill-considered measures."29  Ultimately, it
"serves the important purpose of assuring that a 'national' per-
spective is grafted on the legislative process." ' s
The Court concluded that it must act to ensure the Fram-
ers' intended separation of powers:
The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of
the new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legis-
lative, Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible,
that each branch of government would confine itself to its as-
signed responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within
each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its
power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be
resisted.2 "
It concluded that every act of Congress which is "essentially leg-
islative in purpose and effect"300 must be presented for presiden-
tial veto unless it is expressly exempted from presentment by
the Constitution. 0 '
3. An Act of Legislative Character
In invalidating the legislative veto in the Immigration and
Naturalization Act,02 the Court began with the presumption
that all actions of Congress are legislative in character.0 3 It then
considered the specific nature of the Act and veto at issue. It
found, inter alia, that in suspending Chadha's deportation, the
Attorney General had acted pursuant to a delegation of legisla-
tive power.30 4 "Congress must abide by its delegation of author-
297. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947-48.
298. Id. at 948. The implication here is that the presidential perspective is necessa-
rily broader than that of individual members of Congress who may be beholden to local
interests and supporters.
299. Id. at 951.
300. Id. at 952.
301. The Court asserts that only four provisions in the Constitution expressly estab-
lish the right of one House to act without the requirement of presentment. Id. at 954-55.
The House of Representatives has plenary power to initiate impeachments. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, cl. 5. The Senate has plenary power to conduct impeachment trials, approve or
disapprove presidential appointments and ratify treaties negotiated by the President.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
302. See supra note 288.
303. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951-52.
304. Id. at 954-55.
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ity until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked. '3 0 5 In
other words, Congress has acted to delegate authority through a
legislative act and the President, pursuant to his constitutional
authority,306 has consented to that delegation. For Congress now
to alter that delegation, by vetoing specific actions of the dele-
gatee, would be tantamount to amending the legislation - this
time, without allowing the President the exercise of his
authority.
Nevertheless, the very nature of an invalid legislative veto
- that it seeks to alter or revoke a prior delegation without the
constitutionally mandated legislative process - has led many
commentators to suggest that Chadha is inapplicable to the War
Powers Resolution.
B. Chadha and the War Powers Resolution
The War Powers Resolution provides:
Notwithstanding subsection (b) [the "sixty-day clock" provi-
sion $], at any time that United States Armed Forces are en-
gaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its
possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific
statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the Pres-
ident if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.308
Whether or not the War Powers Resolution would withstand a
constitutional test is dependent upon two factors - the effect of
its severability provision"' and the applicability of the Chadha
rationale to this particular concurrent resolution.
1. The Severability Provision
The War Powers Resolution contains standard severability
language expressing Congress' intent that the remainder of the
resolution remain in effect despite the possible invalidation of
any of its provisions or applications.3 10 It is unlikely that the
305. Id. at 955.
306. See supra notes 290, 294, and accompanying text.
307. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982). See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text.
308. Id. § 1544(c) (emphasis added).
309. Id. § 1548.
310. The Resolution provides that "[i]f any provision of this [joint resolution 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1546(a)] or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held
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Court would find the entire resolution invalid even were it to
invalidate the concurrent resolution provision.
In Chadha, the Court held that it was not necessary to con-
sider the entirety of the Immigration and Naturalization Act be-
cause the "language [of the severability clause] is unambiguous
and gives rise to a presumption that Congress did not intend the
validity of the Act... to depend upon whether the.., clause [at
issue] was invalid. 3 11 The language used in the War Powers
Resolution is virtually identical and the same presumption must
arise. The requirements for consultation with Congress 311 and
for reporting to Congress" 3 may clearly stand alone even given
the invalidation of the concurrent resolution provision. It is not
at all clear, however, that the concurrent resolution provision
would itself be invalidated.
2. The Concurrent Resolution Provision
Many commentators have argued that the concurrent reso-
lution provision of the War Powers Resolution s"" is not of the
same nature as the legislative veto invalidated by Chadha.s1 s
The principal argument in this regard is that Congress was not
seeking to retain a veto power over a previously delegated au-
thority, thereby denying to the President his right to approve or
disapprove the altered delegation. 6 To the contrary, the Con-
gress was asserting that when the President initiates war "with-
out inherent power to do so, [he] is exercising a power that the
Constitution gives exclusively to Congress, without the authority
invalid, the remainder of the [joint resolution] and the application of such provision to
any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby." Id.
311. 462 U.S. at 932.
312. See supra notes 196-197 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
315. See, e.g., Statement of Cornelius B. Kennedy, Senior Conference Fellow, Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United States, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES: LEGISLATIVE VETO OF AGENCY RULES AFTER INS v. Chadha, app. A, at 2
(1983) (arguing that Chadha and its progeny should be read narrowly and that each law
in question will be judged on its individual merits); Javits, supra note 27, at 138 (arguing
that Chadha does not apply); accord, Comment, The Concurrent Resolution Provision of
the War Powers Resolution: Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha and the
Sources of Presidential Warmaking Power, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 983 (1984).
316. See supra text accompanying notes 293-294 (discussing constitutional present-
ment requirements); see also, supra text accompanying note 306.
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of a legislative delegation. ' 17
A second, related argument is that a concurrent resolution
by Congress to end a President's military initiative is not an at-
tempt to create new legislation, while avoiding the requirement
of presentment. Rather, it is an act of Congress "dispelling an
assumption that legislation was intended by Congress."31 In es-
sence, commentators are suggesting that the concurrent resolu-
tion provision does not violate any constitutional separation of
powers, but merely reasserts an already intended constitutional
division.
Not all commentators agree, however. Some view the
Chadha decision in its most sweeping possible aspect. 19 Ulti-
mately, though, the constitutionality of the concurrent resolu-
tion - or even the entire War Powers Resolution - may be a
moot issue, if the judiciary continues to dismiss any related case
under the political question doctrine.
C. The Likelihood of Continued Judicial Abstention
1. Judicial Intervention in Separation of Powers
Controversies
In Marbury v. Madison,20 the Supreme Court asserted its
authority as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."1 In Baker
317. Comment, The Concurrent Resolution Provision of the War Powers Resolu-
tion: Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha and the Sources of Presidential
Warmaking Power, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 983, 988 (1984) (emphasis added).
318. Id. at 999.
319. See, e.g, B. CRAIG, THE LEGISLATIVE VEro: CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF REGULA-
TION (1983). "Today's decision strikes down in one fell swoop provisions in more laws
enacted by Congress than the Court has cumulatively invalidated in its history." Id. at
166.
320. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
321. The court stated:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity ex-
pound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts
must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitu-
tion; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the
court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the consti-
tution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must
determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is the very es-
sence of judicial duty.
Id. at 177-78.
19871
53
PACE LAW REVIEW
v. Carr,3 22 however, the Court considered the process whereby
that interpretation includes a decision as to "whether a matter
has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to an-
other branch of government, or whether the action of that
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed
.... ,23 The Baker Court reviewed decisions in various areas of
controversy 2" to demonstrate that the finding of a political
question "is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional
interpretation." 2 5
To find a case nonjusticiable under the political question
doctrine, there must be
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the im-
possibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifa-
rious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
32 6
The Court concludes, however, that absent the clear presence of
these formulations, "there should be no dismissal for nonjusti-
ciability on the grounds of a political question's presence. "327
The Court has made limited use of the doctrine, perhaps in
recognition of the fact that, unlike dismissals on grounds of
standing, ripeness, or mootness, a dismissal on political question
nonjusticiability entirely removes an issue from the sphere of ju-
dicially controllable action.2 However, the potential for embar-
rassment of, or seeming lack of respect for, a coordinate branch
has not stopped the Court from holding legislative or executive
actions to be unconstitutional.
322. 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
323. Id. at 211.
324. Id. at 211-17.
325. Id. at 211.
326. Id. at 217.
327. Id.
328. See Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analy-
sis, 75 YALE L.J., 517, 537 (1966).
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In Powell v. McCormack, for example, the Court denied
Congress' authority to refuse to seat a duly elected representa-
tive. It reiterated the validity of its Baker criteria, but neverthe-
less found that "[o]ur system of government requires that fed-
eral courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at
variance with the construction given the document by another
branch. The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may cause
cannot justify the courts avoiding their constitutional responsi-
bility."330 Similarly, in United States v. Brown,3 3 1 the Court de-
nied Congress' authority to pass legislation which it deemed vio-
lative of the Constitution, stating that the "Court is always
reluctant to declare that an Act of Congress violates the Consti-
tution, but in this case we have no alternative."3"2
Nor has the executive branch escaped the corrective atten-
tion of the judiciary branch. When President Truman issued an
executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize
and operate the nation's steel mills - claiming authority in rela-
tion to the national defense - the Court held his order to be
unconstitutional.333
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the
Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the
exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid fric-
tion, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the dis-
tribution of the governmental powers among three departments,
to save the people from autocracy.33 4
The Court, concluding that "[i]t is not a pleasant judicial duty
to find that the President has exceeded his powers and still less
so when his purposes were dictated for concern for the Nation's
well-being . . .,5 nevertheless considered the issue to be justici-
able. This contrasts sharply with the Court's dismissal of war
powers cases.
329. 395 U.S. 486 (1968).
330. Id. at 549.
331. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
332. Id. at 462.
333. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
334. Id. at 613-14 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Meyers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
335. Id. at 614.
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2. The War Power: Judicial Deference
In the war powers cases discussed above - Crockett,
Sanchez-Espinoza, and Conyers - the judiciary's general reluc-
tance to resolve separation of powers issues led to dismissal of
the cases on various but related grounds. 33 6 Yet each case was
essentially different. In Crockett,337 the court stressed the im-
practicality of fact-finding given the debated hostilities in El
Salvador."8 In Conyers, however, the occurrence of hostilities
was beyond dispute.33 Despite this fact, the court dismissed the
action, noting that the congressional plaintiffs had failed to per-
suade the entire Congress to their cause. 4
The fact that the plaintiffs were Members of Congress,
rather than the Congress itself, was a common and arguably de-
cisive factor. The judiciary has generally shown greater defer-
ence to the executive branch when it has been challenged by in-
dividual members of the legislature.
In congressional lawsuits against the Executive Branch, a
concern for the separation of powers has led this court consist-
ently to dismiss actions by individual congressmen whose real
grievance consists of their having failed to persuade their fellow
legislators of their point of view, and who seek the court's aid in
overturning the results of the legislative process.""
The cases brought under the War Powers Resolution, how-
ever, did not seek to overturn the results of the legislative pro-
cess, but rather to gain judicial enforcement of a legislative act
- a resolution that asserts what Congress believes to be its con-
stitutional authority. The courts have decided other issues -
impoundment cases, for example - brought by third parties
who claimed the violation of congressional prerogatives. 342 While
not congressional plaintiffs, they were equally entitled to seek
alternative legislative remedies rather than judicial relief.
336. See supra notes 217-284 and accompanying text.
337. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982).
338. See supra notes 217-231 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 277-278 and accompanying text.
341. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
342. The cases are collected in Mikva & Hertz, Impoundment of Funds -The
Courts, The Congress and The President: A Constitutional Triangle, 69 Nw. U.L. REV.
335, 346 n.53 (1974).
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It would seem that the courts are reluctant to decide a po-
tentially divisive separation of powers issue brought by individ-
ual congressional plaintiffs and would defer instead to the im-
plied, although possibly misread, contrary will of the
Legislature.343 Yet it is not the duty of the courts to enforce the
law, but merely to "say what the law is."'3 44 If the judicial branch
were to interpret executive prerogatives contrary to the majority
view of Congress, Congress remains free to enact, revoke, or alter
legislation to effect its intent. It seems likely that given future
cases like Crockett, Sanchez-Espinoza, or Conyers, judicial re-
lief will not be available.
VII. Alternative Solutions: Implications for the Future
Given both the unlikeliness of judicial intervention in sepa-
ration of war powers cases, and the growth of international com-
merce and communication, it is doubtful that the shift toward
greater presidential war-making power will cease. In 1793,
Washington himself did not know of France's war against Great
Britain until one month after its commencement.3 45 Today,
when a President publicly announces either the threat or the
commencement of a military action, the entire world, along with
Congress, has been immediately notified. When President Ken-
nedy announced a blockade of Cuba - precipitating an interna-
tional nuclear crisis - only "[two hours before his decision was
announced to the world, congressional leaders were informed
that the United States was responding to the Soviet missiles
with a naval quarantine. '3 4
The Nation and the world have changed drastically since
the Framers penned the Constitution, but their concern that
there be a separation of powers over war - requiring the collec-
tive judgment of two coordinate branches - is all the more valid
today.
If this increasing executive assertiveness reflects the burdensome
nature of the Presidency, it is, nevertheless, one of the terrible
ironies of American history that as war has become more destruc-
343. See, e.g., supra notes 283-285 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 321.
345. See supra note 65.
346. Neustadt, supra note 31, at 109.
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tive, less humane and less controllable, the power of decision over
war has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of one
American.347
Absent some extraordinary action, it is most unlikely that the
intent of the Framers will once again be given effect.
A. Laissez-Faire: The Road to Executive Autonomy
Congress' unwillingness or inability to strongly assert its
constitutional authority over war and the judiciary's reluctance
to decide the inherent separation of powers issue, virtually dic-
tate executive autonomy in regard to the initiation or risk of
war. The telecommunication technologies which enable the Pres-
ident to instantaneously notify the world of his actions or inten-
tions, also enable him to mold public consensus. Presidents tend
to be forceful persons and, as such, their actions will usually en-
gender public support.348 It is inconceivable that the Framers
could have envisioned our nuclear capability. If the President's
finger rests on the nuclear button, who truly has the power to
declare war? 349
One commentator suggests that "[o]ur Constitution offers
the nation and the world some protection ... through the dis-
pensation of the power to declare and make war, but that pro-
tection is only as strong as the will of the legislative and judicial
branches to invoke and enforce it."3 50 The War Powers Resolu-
tion was such an attempt by the Legislature, but its constitu-
tionality has yet to be acknowledged by any President, affirmed
by the judiciary, or actively asserted by the very branch which
enacted it. It is unlikely that it will stem the tide of executive
power over war.
347. J. JAVITS, supra note 31, at 273.
348. See F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE, supra note 31, at 279-92 (exploring the nature
of this technological and political phenomenon).
349. Professor Wormuth, supra, argues that "such [nuclear] technology demands
more restraint, not less, on the way we go to war." Preface to F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE,
supra note 31, at viii.
350. F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE, supra note 31, at 292.
[Vol. 7:695
58http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss3/7
POWER OVER WAR
B. Strengthening the War Powers Resolution: An Act of
Futility
Some commentators have suggested that Congress redraft
or amend the War Powers Resolution. " ' Yet, assuming argu-
endo that Congress could, and would, enact a stronger resolu-
tion, it would still beg the real issue. Senator Javits himself con-
ceded the inherent weakness of any such congressional
"improvement" of the resolution which he authored. "Congres-
sional will is the issue. It is much more difficult for 535 individu-
als to sustain a single cause of action than it is for a determined
president to have his way." " "
As Presidents continue to disregard the War Powers Resolu-
tion, individual Members of Congress have sought, but been de-
nied, judicial support.35" Even were the entire Congress to at-
tempt to enforce the resolution, it is not at all certain that the
judiciary would declare its constitutionality. Many commenta-
tors have suggested that an attempt at congressional enforce-
ment would be a futile exercise, lacking judicial support.
Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan have all asserted that
the act is unconstitutional, arguing that it ties the hands of the
president.
The logical solution would be to put the question before the
... Supreme Court .... However, there is at least one obsta-
cle . . . the 'political question' doctrine of the Court.3"
The current language of the War Powers Resolution affords
Congress a sufficiently forceful assertion of the separation of
power over war envisioned by the Framers. In the final analysis,
however, either the Congress or individual Members of Congress
must be able to look to the judicial branch to support the Reso-
351. See, e.g, The Final Report of the 1975 Conference on Advocacy, THE POWERS
OF THE PRESIDENCY: ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Recommendation Nos. 10-13, 17, 18, at 19-22, 26-27.
352. Javits, supra note 27, at 139.
353. See supra notes 217-247, 250-265, 272-284, and accompanying text.
354. F. FRIENDLY & M. ELLIOTr, THE CONSTITUTION, THAT DELICATE BALANCE 279-80
(1984). See also, L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 284-325 (1985). Although the War Powers Resolution of 1973 overcame a
veto, it has not survived doubts about its quality and effectiveness." Id. at 309.
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lution and to "say what the law is." 3 5
C. Proposed Amendment to the Constitution
1. The Need for an Amendment
The Court's reluctance to resolve a separation of powers is-
sue between the authority of Congress and the President to ini-
tiate and control war is understandable. The Constitution vests
certain general powers in the executive branch and other, spe-
cific powers in the legislative branch - clearly intending a
struggle between the two coordinate branches."' Yet, that in-
tended struggle presupposed an equal strength which has ceased
to exist in an age of instantaneous warfare and nuclear technol-
ogy, with "the President as a king-general who exercises prerog-
ative or discretionary power to make foreign policy, [and] initi-
ate war . . . .,,7 Somehow we must enable the judiciary to
resolve issues concerning the separation of powers over war and
thereby adapt the Framers' intention to the exigencies of mod-
ern warfare.
Nearly a century ago, former Supreme Court Justice Samuel
Freeman Miller wrote that "[o]f the judicial department of the
Government the Supreme Court is the head and representative,
and to it must come for final decision all the great legal ques-
tions which may arise under the Constitution .... ,"'" Surely,
the right of the Congress to share with the President the power
over war, and to temper the potentially far-reaching actions of
one individual, is one of the great legal issues of our time. If the
judicial branch is unable to find within the Constitution the au-
thority to address that issue, then perhaps it is time to amend
the Constitution accordingly.
355. See supra note 321.
356. See supra notes 1-25 and accompanying text.
357. E. KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR 2 (1982). Keynes goes on to note that in contrast
to this modern view of presidential power, "the Framers had a limited conception of
executive authority." Id.
358. S. MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 376 (1893).
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2. The Language of the Amendment
This author proposes the addition of but one phrase to the
Commander in Chief clause of the Constitution. 5 After the
words "Commander in Chief," these words may be added: "sub-
ject to any and all reasonable restrictions which may be imposed
by Congress."
The additional language would almost certainly have two
distinct and beneficial effects. First, and foremost, it would
make judicial intervention more likely. By vesting in Congress a
constitutional right to define the President's commander in chief
authority, it might lessen the Court's reluctance to consider
challenges to executive authority over the initiation or risk of
war.310 Second, it would tend to restore the struggle for power
envisioned by the Framers by allowing the judicial branch to de-
fine the word "reasonable. ' 361 The use of such an intentionally
broad word would enable the courts to adapt what they perceive
to be constitutional intent to continually changing situations.
3. The Likelihood of Success
Although Justice Miller believed it was the duty and privi-
lege of the Court to decide all great legal questions, he was well
aware of its limitations. He referred to the judiciary as "by far
the feeblest branch of department of the Government. It must
rely upon the confidence and respect of the public for its just
weight and influence ... 36 The proposed amendment would
signal the Court that the nation desires its active participation
in the restoration of balance between the executive and legisla-
tive branches over the power to risk and initiate war.
Whether such an amendment might gain national accept-
359. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
360. Any similar restriction of the "executive power," id. § 1, cl. 1, would clearly be
overbroad and unmanageable. Without such a restriction, the President might still claim
a constitutional basis for unilateral action, but that claim would be seriously weakened
by the added constitutional restraint on his Commander in Chief power.
361. Just as it is not desirable to have all power over war in the hands of the Presi-
dent, neither should we seek to allow Congress to gain plenary control. The desired sepa-
ration and balance of power is a struggle between the two coordinate branches, with
judicial intervention to adapt the struggle to ever-changing needs and exigencies. See
supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
362. .S. MILLER, supra note 358, at 418.
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ances63 and, if so, whether it would truly be as effective as sug-
gested here, are difficult questions certainly open to conjecture
and debate. One might also question whether Congress would
even vote to propose such an amendment.3 64 It was only after a
protracted and costly war that Congress acted to attempt to re-
store a constitutional balance of power. It may be that an-
other crisis must occur before Congress will again attempt to
regain its constitutional authority over war. The so-called "Iran-
Contra" affair may be that crisis,366 or it may be the next execu-
tive response to terrorism.367
These questions undoubtedly require a considered and
lengthy analysis which would cloud the focus of this Comment.
Accordingly, their consideration is left to any who may find
merit in the proposed amendment.
VIII. Conclusion
As we celebrate our Constitution's bicentennial, it is clear
that the power to initiate and risk war has moved steadily and
inexorably into the hands of the President alone.366 Following a
period of national upheaval, Congress passed legislation reas-
serting its constitutional authority over war.369 Since that time,
however, Congress has lacked either the will or the capacity to
363. The amendment would require ratification by 38 ("three-fourths of the sev-
eral") states. U.S. CONsT. art. V.
364. "The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution ...." Id.
365. See supra notes 188-206 and accompanying text.
366. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1987, at A16, col. 1 (editorial opinion that if any
good is to come of the Iran-Contra affair, it will be the reaffirmation of law and limits on
executive authority).
367. In 1986, President Reagan, without the consent or knowledge of the Congress,
ordered military strikes against Libya in response to claims of Libyan-backed terrorism.
Congress applauded the President's actions - despite what congressional leaders con-
ceded to be a lack of compliance with the War Powers Resolution. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25,
1986, at All, col. 1. See also, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at A1, col. 6 (describing congres-
sional support for a subsequent direct air attack on Libya which almost assassinated
Libyan leader Qaddafi and did seriously injure his children). Congress' support of such
executive initiatives probably reflected the utter frustration of American citizens contin-
ually threatened with and exposed to terrorist attacks abroad. Had the military initia-
tives led to a larger conflict, one may question whether Congress would have been as
supportive.
368. See supra notes 101-128, 348-350, and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 176-206 and accompanying text.
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assert its authority and only a few, individual Members of Con-
gress have attempted to do what the Congress would not. Those
individuals have faced a judicial branch unwilling to aid in the
restoration of a balance of power, holding instead to a doctrine
of nonjusticiability.3 7 0 A constitutional amendment would enable
the judiciary to decide questions of warmaking and might well
spur Congress to greater action in fulfilling its intended role.
For better or worse, we live in a nuclear age. The stakes of
war are not those of an earlier age, when we could engage in a
war and, subsequently regretting the action, reprimand the Pres-
ident and pay reparations to a country unjustly harmed. 7 1 To-
day, the President is in control of a vast and frightening arsenal
of power - one which many believe is powerful enough to cause
the actual extinction of the human race. 7 2 The Framers' in-
tended separation of power over war is no longer merely desira-
ble - it is crucial.
Surely the wisdom of the Framers is unassailable: deliberation
and debate are essential before this nation commits itself to those
initial steps toward nuclear war which once taken, may not be
retraceable. Congressional powers over the conduct of foreign re-
lations, and ultimately, the war power, must be invoked before
the state becomes committed to a course of conduct that is deter-
ministic and irreversible, a course that allows no alternative to
nuclear war.37"
The bicentennial of our Constitution is a most appropriate
time to increase the nation's awareness that a major shift of con-
stitutional power, although unintended by the Framers, has
nonetheless occurred. The proposed amendment would afford a
timely national debate over a crucial constitutional issue. "It is
not as if the Framers did not foresee that the fledgling, seacoast
nation would cover the continent and from time to time need to
change the Constitution. For in article V they provided a process
of amendment .... To breathe new life into our Constitution
370. See supra notes 217-246, 250-265, 272-282, and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
372. See, e.g., F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE, supra note 31, at 269-70 (discussing the
likely biological and climatological effects of a nuclear exchange).
373. Id. at 272.
374. R. BEGGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 91 (1971).
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through such an amendment - and to seek the nation's consid-
eration of its language and intent - would afford the finest pos-
sible celebration of its two-hundredth anniversary.
Steven J. Young
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